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CHAP'l'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
190031 
"In Europe it is often said that the t heology of hope is neither 
a school nor a movement, but a book; 111 That book is Theologie der 
Hoffnung, by Jurgen Holtmann. In Europe no more can be said about the 
theology of hope than has already been said by Holtmann. His work has 
become the measure of the school of theology which claims history as its 
special province! So the study here attempted is devoted mostly to that 
book in an effort to evaluate and underst and the contribution it has 
made to the contemporary discussion of history and its relationship to 
Christian hermeneutics. 
Dr. Jlirgen Moltmann is a professor of systematic theology at the 
University of Tubingen, Germany. His work is relatively new to the 
non-German-speaking world. His first book to be translated into English 
was Theologie der Hoffnung.2 The translation was made by James Leitch 
of Liverpool, England, and is entitled Theology of Hope.3 Since the 
publication of this translation Moltmann has become popular in the 
theological acadellzy'. He has written many articles in both German and 
1 Walter Capps, Time Invades the Cathedral (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1,72), p. 41. 
2J~rgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung (i'iinchen; Kaiser Verlag, 
1965). 
3Jurgen Moltmann, Theolog,y of Hope, translated by James Leitch 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967). 
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English, as well as another major book. Moltmann's later works develop 
the theme of a "political hermeneutic," or the interpretation of the New 
Testament message in terms of political action. But the foundation for 
everything else that Holtmann says is laid in Theology of Hope. 
Why is the concept of the theology of hope important? Because it 
is the first systematic theology to appear in recent times that departs 
from the two extreme theologies that have dominated twentieth-century 
thought. Moltmann does not think in existentialist categories as do 
Rudolf Bultmann, Heinrich Ott, and Gerhard 1'beling. Nor does he 
emphasize secular theology as did James Robinson, Thomas Altizer, 
Kenneth Hamilton, and Harvey Cox. Instead, Moltmann has written the 
charter document for what he perceived to be the most actively growing 
school of thought. He wanted to reopen the possibility of learning 
from the apocalyptic message of Judaism, Jesus, and the early Church. 
But he did not want to settle for a mere description of that message. 
He wanted to apply it, in its full biblical context, to action in the 
present time, in fact, to a specific program of action. 
Time is important for Moltmann. His schematization is horizontal 
rather than vertical, with change more important than permanence, action 
more dominant than structure.4 Soterioiogy is ancillary to eschatology, 
and the very idea of salvation is corporate and universal rather than 
individual or particular.5 But one should not too quickly label Molt-
mann1s theology as purely "secular." He does take history seriously, but 
4 Capps, p. 130. 
5Ibid. 
3 
the nonn of history is the future, not the present. 'I'he dialectical 
historical process prohibits such a thing as an ontological seculurn. 
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann attempts to reach back to Albert 
Schweitzer and the debate about the "Historical Jesus." He sees the 
time of Schweitzer as the watershed of biblical interpretation, the 
time when theologians really began to study the Scriptures on their own 
terms. Moltmann has begun, as Heino Kadai has observed, to forge a 
language of hope that corresponds to the biblical category of promise, 
which makes eschatology a dominant theme of Christian preaching.6 
Along with the new emphasis on eschatology, Moltmann presents the 
contemporary theologian with a corresponding set of ethical questions. 
The Christian must live in history. His approach to history must be 
guided by his theology. The church must minister to history and teach 
its people how to relate theology to it. Theology of Hope, particularly 
the last section, is rich in material for the pastor who wants to teach 
his people to confront history with hope, to produce an eschatological 
ethics. 
Wolf-Dieter V.arsch has swnmarized Moltmann I s theology under four 
key headings. The first is the doctrine of the ultimate time which 
Moltmann asserts vis-~-vis Bultmann, whose mai n concern was the 
liberation of the subject from objective history.? Moltmann's concept 
'Heino Kadai, "History and Hermeneutics," A Project in Biblical 
Hermeneutics (Commission on Theology and Church Relations of the 
Lutheran Church--t1iiss ouri Synod, 1 %, ) , p. 1 33. 
7vJolf-Dieter Marsch, 11Zur Einleitung: Wohin-jenseits der 
Alternativen," Diskussion uber die 'l'heologie der Hoffnung (Munchen: 
Kaiser Verlag, 1967), p. 1G. 
4 
of ultimate time is within the category of historical time. Secondly, 
God's "new act" after the death of Christ, which pushes the reader to 
examine history, directs the attention to promises rather than perman-
ence.a Thirdly, God's "apodictic Word," seen as human response to a 
divine promise, is part of the historical process itself.' And, finally, 
the ethics of criticism, the fellowship of the antithesis10 causes 
Moltmann to seek what he would later call his "political hermeneutic" 
of the Gospel. 
The thesis here presented attempts to answer the question whether 
or not Moltmann's Theology of HGpe, offers an answer to the impasse of 
understanding, described by William Hordern as follows: 
On the one hand, modern theology recognizes that Christianity 
is a historical faith, rooted in events that happened. On 
the other hand, when it attempts to show how f~th is related 
to historical studies, there is no agreement. 
Chapter II analyzes this impasse in detail. Chapter III analyzes 
&ltmann's methodology for overcoming it, the "history of traditions." 
Chapter IV deals with Moltmann's philosophy of history gleaned by the 
use of his method from the biblical material, describes his eschatology 
as well as his debt to Ernst Bloch. There it moves on to an attempt 
at relating Moltmann's work to modern labels on the basis of this one 
book. Chapter V relates some of Moltmann's lesser works to his 
Theolag}' of Hope. 
8Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
1olli£.. 
William Hordern, "Introduction" New Directions in Theology Today 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1,0,), I, ,2-,3. 
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Uses ecclesiastical And Chapter VI is the critique, in which the writer 
the Contempor.ary church, standards to evaluate Mo1tmann's contribution to 
attempts to identify the place of the theology of hope on the theolGgical 
map by tracing selected coordinates and comine to a conclusion. In the 
conclusion, the writer sununarizes his answer to the question mentioned 
above: whether Theology of Hope offers a solution to the impasse. 
In reading this dissertation it will be necessary to understand 
certain terms used by both the writer and by Maltmann. The term "historcism" 
denotes the philosophy in which history is a closed system of cause and 
effect. The terms Historie and Geschichte 1 presented in this paper in 
German either in the text or in parentheses, behind the English word 
"history," were originally coined by Martin Kahler. Kahler was reacting 
against the attempt of the nineteenth-century theologians to present an 
historical portrait cf Jesus without taking seriously the great salvation 
which the biblical writers had found in Him. 12 Moltmann uses these tenns, 
as did the existentialist theologians, the former term referring to 
what can be established as having happened, the latter to the meaning 
of what has happened. 
Another difficult group of werds are taken from G. F. w. Hegel and 
Karl Marx, dealing with the dialectical nature of the historical process. 
The tenn "contradiction" (Widerspruch) denotes the ethical activity of 
criticism, while "anithesis" (Differenze) denotes the entire dialectical 
"side" in a given cycle of the historical process. "Reality" or 
"thesis" (Wirklichkeit) represent the other "side." 
12Ibid. I, 58. 
' 
The term eschatologia crucis is Moltmann's own, but the idea is 
borrowed from Luther's theologia crucis. Refusing to accept fully the 
vertical dimension of Lutheranism, Moltmann tries to find a mare dynamic 
expression. His own eschatology, as will be pointed out below, is a 
"cross with hope" eschatology, primarily concerned with corporate 
fellowship rather than with individual blessedness. 
Next come the terms dealing with promise and fulfillment. The 
term Wirklichkeit in the German original sometimes comes close to 
meaning "fulfilment," but in a "theology of hope" sense; that is, an 
incomplete, conditional fulfilment, that historical reality which we 
know, or which some character from the past knew. The promises include 
.. 
Wirklichkeit, of course, but they include something else, the Uberschuss, 
or "overspill" (Leitch), which stands against the historical reality 
Drought about by the incomplete and conditional fulfilment of the promise 
in a dialectical relationship, er.eating the antithesis to it. As the 
horizan of history moves forward, that "overspill" becomes important, 
and the community committed ta the antithesis remembers it. For the 
contemporary interpreter,· past instances of thesis and anti thesis alike 
have become &erlieferungen, or "traditions." 
Finally, something has to be said about the term the present 
writer has coined and employed in the thesis. This is the tenn "anthro-
potheism•" One might also use the perjorative term "anthropolatry" as 
a corresponding verbal noun. Both words are synthetic creation of Greek 
prefixes and suffixes used according to their standard English meanings. 
The term "atheist" is definitely inaccurate to describe even Bloch, let 
alone Moltmann. Both Bloch and Mol tmann do have a "god." The term 
7 
"hwnanist" is too imprecise, for it is used today to describe, for 
example, both Bishop James A. Pike and Yevgeny Yevtushenko. l-bltmann 
and Bloch believe in the future of humanity. The difference between 
them is that in Moltmann's case that future is inseparable from the 
future of Jesus Christ as he understands the latter. 
Has Moltmann found an answer to the impasse of understanding? 
Does he indeed take history more seriously than Bultmann did? Does 
his eschatology so color his hermeneutics as to lose the category of 
history? These are the questions one should ask in order to under-
stand what this study is all about. The writer hopes that his work 
on this dissertation has helped to provide access to some of the 
questions raised by the issues. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
M0LTMANN'S APPROACH TO AN IMPASSE OF UNDERSTANDING: 
HISTORICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEOLCGY 
Jurgen Moltmann wrote his Theology of Hope in the face of a long 
dominant historicism, particulary of the positivist variety. What is 
of special interest to the present study is the way in which Moltmann 
has come to grips with the so-called "principle of analogy," as advocated 
by historicists. 
A basic presupposition of historicists (such as Wilhelm Dilthey 
and Ernst Troeltsch) is a "common core of similarity111 underlying all 
reality. That is, in order to understand the details of history, the 
historicist assumes methodologically a principle of analogy. He 
assumes thereby that all events in history take place within those 
limits of similarity which positivists believe are common to all that 
is·· real. Existentialist theologians accepted this principle of 
analogy and applied it to biblical history. As a result, their various 
reconstructions of biblical history generally shared a co1JUnon limit. 
This limit has influenced the efforts of certain other theologians 
who are not themselves committed to existentialist theology, such as 
R.R. Niebuhr when he says: 
1J~rgen Moltma.nn, Theolof, of Hope, translated by James Leitch 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1~,7~ P• 176. 
' 
Whether it be the idea of Jesus Christ, or of faith, or of 
the ~hristian ~onununity that is offered as the key to the. 
mearung of Gods. self-revelation in history, the way in which 
that s~lf-r~vealing !!!£ ~ .2!'.!l existence participate in~ ~ historical .f2r!!! !n9_ substantiality remains obscure.2 
The words "historical form and substantiality" reveal an acceptance 
on Niebuhr's part of the principle of analogy; he has assumed that all 
history, including the history of God's self-revelation, has something 
in common with present existence. Niebuhr was not advocating this 
principle. He was using it, and it led him to a problem. He wanted 
to find a key to the scriptures, but nothing in his own experience 
presented itself as such a hermeneutical tool 0 
Moltmann's studies have led him to the same impasse. The Bible 
has much to say about hope, about the future, about conditions which 
contradict present conditions. What kind of analogy can one use to 
interpret biblical eschatology? Then there is the question of Jesus 
Christ, his death and resurrection. Holtmann does not believe that 
historicism can ever do justice to this event, or rather these events, 
because for all their relatedness, these events do contradict one 
another, and at the present time, if viewed historically, must be 
viewed separately. The resurrection presents a special difficulty 
because nothing exists today that is analogous to it. Therefore no 
principle of analogy can be employed to study it. What methodology 
can one use, then, to interpret the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ? 
2R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: 
Charles Scribners' Sons, 1,57), p. 72. 
• 
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The Principle of Analogy 
The situation thus described, which Moltmann faced, involves an 
understanding of historical inquiry as one which requires analogical 
reasoning .3 This methodology, as was mentioned before, is grounded in 
an "ontological" assumption of a conunon core of similarity underlying 
all events. This, for example, was the position of Ernst Troeltsch.4 
Without this more basic, metaphysical assumption of similarity, the 
analogical principle would be unintelligible. Therefore all historical 
understanding must remain within the realm of what is comprehensible 
in terms of analogy.5 
The biblical message, however, refuses to fit inta this 
predetermined picture. 
In face of this basing of historical understanding on a 
metaphysical definition of the core, the substance or the 
subject of history, Christian theology finds itself in 
grave difficulties as it seeks to reflect upon the proclama-
tion of the resurrection. In face of the pantheistic 
definition of the nature of history, according to which 
the eternal iQea does not delight to present itself wholly 
in an individual, it becomes impossigle to regard a person 
and an event in history as absolute. 
This is indeed a problem for the Christian theologian, a problem 
which would not present itself to him if he could either make little 
of the resurrection accounts, which would be untrue to his theolog-
ical task, 
3Moltma.nn, p. 175 . 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
•Ibid. , p. 177. 
11 
or if he could bypass the common core similarity in just one case, 
not necessarily one event, but one set of events. 
In face of the positivistic and mechanistic definition of 
the nature of history as a self-contained system of cause 
and effect, the assertion of a raising of ,Jesus by God appears 
as a IT(Yth concerning a supernatural incursion which is 
contradicted by all our experience of the world. And finally, 
in face of the philosophy of life with its definition of the 
creative ground of life that manifests and objectifies itself 
in history, the Easter texts can be taken only as the expres~ion 
of the life acts of a faith which is in itself unfathomable.·( 
The historian, unlike the natural scientist, is unable to experience 
his subject matter. &> the theologian, confronted with the task of 
interpreting the Bible, has more in common with the historian (who 
like-wise cannot deal with empirical data) than with the natural 
scientist (who insists on dealing with nothing else). The historian 
uses the principle of analogy to cope with this inability, taking an 
event which he has experienced or can probably experience as the analogue 
to the event which he must study. Moltmann, as a theologian who is 
deeply concerned with history, finds that he has to use the principle 
of analogy as historians do, but only as a methodological tool. He 
can pick this tool up and put it down again when he finds that it 
does not accomplish the task. Moltmann does not tie the principle of 
analogy to an ontological presupposition of a common core of similarity 
as Troeltsch once did. This frees Moltmann to explore new possibilities 
in hermeneutics which would not be permitted under historicism.8 
7rbid. 
8Ibid., p. 176. 
-12 
The existential theologians developed their hermeneutical programs 
dogmatically, beginning with historicism, then searching around the 
field of contemporary experience for the analogue. Rudolf Bultmann is 
a good example. His program was arranged around what Carl Braaten calls 
his "non-theological point of contact,"' a cultural jumping-off place 
from which to draw the analogy between the present, in which the 
interpreter must work, and the past, in which the documents arose. For 
Bultmann this point of contact was the existential philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger. Bultmann saw Heidegger's alternatives of authentic and 
inauthentic existence as analogous to St. Paul's dichotomy between the 
spirit and the flesh. He identified the ancient analogue with the 
modern, and that identity became the starting point for his theology. 10 
Other existential theologians have not gone so far as Bultmann. Heinrich 
Ott, for example, does not identify his past and present analogues, but 
strives for meaningful "dialogue II between Heidegger I s philosophy and 
Barthain and Bultmannian theology.11 
R.R. Niebuhr's limitations under the principle of analogy have 
been referred to above. He is not an existentialist, like Bultmann 
and Ott, therefore his non-theological point of contact does not come 
from Heidegger. He developed one trial point of contact in his essay 
Archegos. 12 The analogue for Niebuhr is personhood, and the philosopher 
'John B. Cobb, "A New Trio Arises in Europe," New Theology, edited 
by Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1,,5), II, 260-2,1 • 
10Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
•i.R. R. Niebuhr, 11 Archegos, 11 Christian Histo and Inter retation, 
edited by W.R. Farmer, et al. (Cambridge: University Press, 1,67. 
1J 
of history Wilhelm Dilthey is his cultural source for his point of 
contact. The link that connects the reader with Israel or the early 
Christian community is the "moral experience of coming to life as 
persons. 11 13 Dilthey called this "the rediscovery of the I in the thou." 14 
This means that the present-day man can identify with the corporate 
personality of Israel or the early church and so find the analogue 
which opens the Scriptures for him. In the miraculous beginnings of 
Israel's history man finds the analogue to his birth. In their many 
compromises with pressures from the outside he finds something very 
similar to the experience of personal guilt. In the impotence of 
Israel in the face of arising danger he finds the analogue to his fail-
ures, and to his sense of being helpless in the presence of a power 
which he cannot use. 
lfoltmann, however, confronts the existentialists and Niebuhr with 
the question: So what? So what if we can find a similarity between 
events in the Bible and events today? Does that completely comprehend 
the history of Israel? Is that all that history is, the constant re-
currence of events that we can experience here and now? What about 
the resurrection of Jesus Christ? To what does that correspond in 
present reality? Since the common core of similarity itself, the 
ground of historicism's principle ef analogy, is itself grounded not 
in empirical evidence but in the positivist's interpretation of that 
13Ibid., p. ,4. 
14Ibid., p. 80. 
• 
14 
evidence, Moltmann can dispense with the core, and find new ways to 
use the principle of analogy, free from the limitations of historicism. 
Moltmann's first suggested departure is an application of the 
principle of analogy that leaves room for the contingent and the new.15 
Instead of presupposing that all events are similar, one might pre-
suppose that ne two events are similar, or that some events are similar 
but not ethers. For the dissimilar events, Moltmann prefers to use 
the word "new", because his own point of contact, which will be dis-
cussed later, is both dialectical and dynamic. The word "new" lends 
itself to describe contingent events much better than the static and 
passive "dissimilar." Should the historian assume that no twe events 
are similar, the consequence would be constant equivocation in every 
statement he might make about his subject matter. A more responsible 
assumptien is that some events are similar and others are unique, what 
M:>ltmann call a "supplementary interest in the new." 1, While Moltmann can 
find no fault with such an approach on cenceptual grounds, he does not 
find it adequate in itself to explain the history to which the New 
Testament bears witness. "This would merely represent a variant in 
the historical picture which would still be possible and conceivable 
without a theology of the resurrection. 11 17 The Scriptures do not present 
the resurrection as an isolated, accidental event that just happened to 
be dissimilar from other events. 
15Moltmann, p. 11,. 
1
'Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
15 
For the ra.i.sing of Christ involves not the category of the 
accidentally new, but the expectational category of the 
eschatologically new. The eschatologically new event of 
the resurrection of Christ, however, proves to be a n0vum 
ultimum both as against the similarity in ever-recurring 
reality and also as against the comparative dissimilarity 
of new possibilities emerging· in history.18 
Medieval theologians used the term novissima to refer to the events 
of the end of time, to the hora novissima. Moltmann is willing to use 
the term the same way, not in an Aristotelian sense, as it occurs in 
Bernard of Morlaix's poem, nor in the accidental sense as the word "new" 
is commonly used in English, but in an eschatological sense that takes 
all history seriously. 
By the raising of Christ we do not mean a possible process 
in world history, but the1;schatological process to which all history is subjected. 
This is because the resurrection, while it was an event in history, 
was not part of the system of history as understood by historicism. 
Rather, it assailed that system from the outside. The term "eschato-
logically new," based as it is on the medieval concept, denotes the 
radicality of the event and the force by which the event shapes the 
future, subjecting the processes of history to its own criticism.26 
So Noltmann takes his own approach to the principle of analogy, 
using eschatology as his starting paint. This is his "analogy for 
18Ibid. 
1
'rbid., p. 11,-1ao. 
28Ibid. 
, 
• 
16 
the future. 11 Moltmann had said that theology also had the option of 
constructing its own CQncept of history on a basis of an eschatological 
understanding of the resurrection, freeing theology from any existing 
concept of history. In this case the theologian could attempt to 
arrive at a new understanding of history with ultimate possibilities 
and hopes derived from the presupposition ef the raising of Christ 
from the dead. 21 
What are the consequences of this ld.nd of analogical theory for 
hermeneutical practice? It directs Christian hermeneutics toward 
present mission and future hope. 
Then the resurrectien ef Christ does not offer itself as an 
analogy to what can be experienced any time and anywhere, but 
as an analogy of what is to come to all •.••• It must 
therefore contradict all rigid substantiometaphysical 
definitions ef the common core of similarity in world 
... events, and therefore also the corresponding historical 
understanding that works with analogy. It must develop a 
historical understanding which works with eschatological 
analegy • ••• 22 
This analogy for the future will be referred to again when the 
discussion turns to solutions offered in Theology of Hope. Here the 
author's only concern is to try to point out some of the cogitations 
that Moltmann implies he experienced in wrestling with the impasse 
presented to him by analogical historical reason. In the preceding 
discussion one problem was central to all of M:>ltmann's attack on 
existential theology and historicism. That problem must now be 
discussed. 
21 Ib1.· d., 18" p. "'• 
17 
The Historical Question of the Resurrection 
It was noted above that according to the canons of "the positivistic 
and mechanistic definition of the nature of history" with which the 
existentialists worked "the assertion of a raising of Jesus by God 
appears as a myth. 1123 M:>ltmann was observing the conclusions drawn by 
Bultmann, as may be described by the following quotes: 
But what of the resurrection? Is it not a mythical event 
pure and simple? Obviously it is not an event of past 
history with a self-evident meaning.24 
An historical fact which involves a resurrection from the 
dead is utterly inconceivable.25 
By "~h" Bultmann meant an event conceivable to a particular way of 
looking at the world, the mythological, which was prevalent in the first 
century but is now generally considered t~ be untenable. This conclu-
sion lead Bultmann to a program of demythologizing. Hermeneutics 
involved presenting a gospel that did not depend on a direct relation-
ship to an "utterly inconceivable" event. Holtmann makes a great deal 
more of this step in procedure than Bultmann, who passes over this 
important conclusion with a simple adverb, implying that the need for 
demythologizing is oavious to all. 
The first question regarding the reality of the resurrection of 
Christ will always be concerned with the fact which is reported 
23Ibid., p. 177. 
24Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and },\ythology," Kery~ and Myth, 
edited by Hans Werner Bartsch (New ~ork: Harper & Row, 1,,i; p. J8. 
25Ibid., p. J,. 
I 
a 
18 
and proclaimed by the Easter witnesses. Since this fact is 
reported as an event, the question as to the reality of this 
event will
6
in the first instance take the form of a historical 
question.2 
So Moltmann is asking a factual questien : ls the event which is 
repttrted and proclaimed a "real" event? In this centext one might 
well substitute the word "historical" for the word "real, 11 since 
M:>ltmann says he is concerned with facticity, and is willing to sub-
mit to the results of historical inquiryo 
There would be no problem here except for the subjugation of all 
historical inquiry to positivistic historicism. It was the assumption 
that historicism contained the only intellectually cogent methods of 
inquiry that led Bultmann to conclude that the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ was inconceivable. Meltmann agrees that if one only works with 
historicism, then history is man's history alone; man is the "real" 
subject of history in the sense of its metaphysical hypckeimenGn, and 
divine activity, such as the raising of Jesus Christ from the dead is 
historically meaningless.27 
For the existentialists on the other hand, meaning is divorced 
from fact, faith is separated from history, the world is divided into 
two parts. One is o'bjectivity, dealing •,.i:i.th what can be experienced 
or deonstrated; the other is subjectivity, which is private, individual, 
inward, concerned with interpretation rather than perceptiGn, with 
2
'Moltmann, p. 172. 
27~., p. 174 .. 
-, 
reflection rather than experience. History, accordingly, is split 
into two levels which are recognized by their German names: Historie, 
the pursuit of facts and the findings of that pursuit, and Geschichte, 
the pursuit of meaning, the interpretation, and the final tale as it 
is told by the writing historian as the end product of both processes. 
Christian faith is assigned to the subjective realm, and accordingly, 
the resurrection, as a product of faith, is expelled from Hi.storie 
(except in a demythologized £orm) and is assigned to the interpreters 
•f Geschichte. 
The dichotomy between subject and object is a direct result of 
the positivist view of the wcrld. As a result, it has been criticized 
by theologians who want to take history seriously. For example, Eric 
G. Rust in his book Toward a Theological Understanding of Hi.sto¢8 
has apparently shared some of Moltmann's concerns about Bultmann's 
existentialist dichotomy: 
1'he danger of the movement of Bultmann and his followers is 
that they should divorce the meaning from the historical 
actuality, separate Geschichte from Hi.storie, until, for 
some extremeists, it would not appear to matter whether 
the resurrection was an actual event in world history so 
long as the church could affirm its faith in a risen Lord. 
The recognition that history has an inner and an outer side 
is one thing. The attempt to emphasize the fonner at the 
expense of the latter will mean in the end that the former 
also ceases to be historical revelation. It becomes dissolved 
into a modern form of n~o-Platonic mysticism, and history 
does not really matter.~, 
28Eric G·. Rust, Toward a Theolo ical Understandin of Histo 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1,,3 • 
2
'Ibid., p. ,?. 
-Moltmann like Rust, also warns against this inevitable result of 
making a sharp division between the subjective and the objective: 
If according to this now universally binding and universally 
recognized view of reality, scientifically and historically 
speaking, the gods are silent~-or hearing them is 0ptional and 
lef't to the individual's discretion - then a theology of 
the resurrection can be developed only at a point which is 
not affected by this view of reality and comes under the aegis 
of the individual's subjectivity--which, however, means only 
in that realm of human subjectivity and inwardness which is 
set free by ~he rationalizing of the world and the historicizing 
of history.3 
God, and all kinds of statements about God, are not the subject 
matter of t ·he historicist's history, of Historie, as Bultmann and 
Rust have used the term. Moltma.nn also uses the term this way at 
the beginning of his book, where he discusses his problem with histor-
icism. Later on, when he proposes his own program for hermeneutics, 
he uses Historie in another sense, making use of the principles of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, which will be discussed in Chapter III below. 
The impasse imposed on Moltmann by the historicists may best 
be summarized by saying that positivistic historicism cannot be used 
as a way of explaining the resurrection event. (Nor, as will soon be 
shown, could Moltmann simply turn his back on it.) Those theologians 
who could see no other form of historical explanation than that con-
tained in historicism had to by-pass history altogether as a 
hermeneutical category. Holtmann describes his impasse thus: 
If the reality of the resurrection cannot be comprehended 
by the historical means of the modern age, neither is the 
modern intellectual way of dealing with history comprehensible 
for faith. 
3~Moltmann, P• 181. 
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The fides guarens intellectum must then give up all claim to 
an intellectus fidei in the realm of history. This is 
primarily done by the existentialists by theology's leaving 
aside the historical question as to the reality of the 
resurrection ••• It then leaves the knowledge of history 
to all kinds of pantheistic or atheistic principles, and 
concentrates on the personal encounter, the non-objectifiable 
experience or the existential decision, to which the Easter 
kerygma leads) 1 
What is a theologian to do? Could~ possibly aspire to attain 
a theological view of history, "a revolution in the historical way of 
thinking"?32 R.R. Niebuhr's claim that theology's problem with histor-
ical reason lies in the fact that the theologian has fallen victim to 
a "heterogenous historical method" and therefore "is bound to become 
increasingly skeptical about the actual historical data of the New 
Testament"33 is another good summary statement of this side of Moltmann's 
dilemma. Both theologians have noticed the impasse, both are aware 
that the dichotomy between subject and object is itself non-objectifiable, 
and the two serve as interlocutors in the developing dialogue in which 
new possibilities for hermeneutics are "brainstormed." Historicism as 
a discipline for explaining historical events is heterogeneous to 
theology, and one might add heteronomic as well. Nevertheless, theo-
logical thinking has dealth with no other history than the historicist's. 
Niebuhr's contribution toward solving this enigma has been the 
suggestion of two alternatives to historicism: 
31Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
32Ibid., PP• 181-182. 
33Niebuhr, Resurrection, pp. 1,-ss. 
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There are two possible methods for attacking the tension 
between the modern idea of historical causality and the 
resurrection event. One is to develop a strictly scientific 
theology with its own unique method which does not borrow 
critical or positive principles from other disciplines. 
The other is to reexamine the nature of historical causality 
and re-define it, if necessary. The latter course would 
involve a careful inquiry into the nature of historical 
thought a~g its relationship to the program of Christian 
theology. 
The first alternative proposes theological science as a new 
method of hi.storical explanation, in which theology would develop its 
own canons for interpreting historical events. The advantage would be 
that theology could no longer complain about a heterogeneous method of 
studying hi.story. Moltmann does not approve of it however, for it 
represents the other side of the impasse. He cites Mi.ldenberger's 
criticism of Niebuhr's first suggestion and agrees that it is subject 
to that criticism. Mildenberger said that although Niebuhr's scientific 
theology would enable the theologian so speak "Christianly" about his-
tery, it would also subject actuality (Wirklichkeit) to the human com-
munity (menschliche Gemeinschaft) as the reality against which one 
comprehends all events.35 This human community, then, would take the 
place of another human community, the scientific and technical 
community, as the standard by which reality is measured. Now 
Mildenberger does not say that the scientific and technical community 
has any ontological ground for its assertions, as Troeltsch's common 
core of similarity, but he does argue that most people would not be 
34~., P• 33. 
35F. Mildenberger, 11Auferstanden am dritten Tage nach den Schriften," 
Evangelische Theologie XX.III (1,•3), 274-715. 
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able to comprehend the church's proclamation, the apologetic task would 
suffer, and the church would be drawn into an ideological "ghetto. 1136 
t-bltmann agrees that the church's hermeneutical task would be ill-served 
if it did not make the faith and its sources intelligible to those out-
side the church.37 This, then, is the other side of the impasse. 
Moltmann is forced to discard the alternative of a theological view of 
history that by-passes, rather than confronts, positivism. 
Niebuhr's second alternative was to seek within the discipline 
of history itself a new defi~tion of history which would be more amenable 
te theology. If that were possible it would not be subject to Milden-
berger1s criticism, because theology would still be using a discipline 
that was comprehensible to the community outside the church. Niebuhr 
faults historicists for treating historical events as though they were 
natural phenomena, and thereby mald.ng the canons of natural science the 
principles of historiography, forgetting that a •:non-natural dimension 
of history" also exists.JS As Schleiermacher erred because he used rules 
of natural law instead of the canons of historical sequence at the 
critical point of contact between Jesus and the early church, Niebuhr 
believes that by reversing the process the resurrection can become mean-
ingful to the historical reason of the Christian theologian.J, 
J'Ibid. 
371-k>ltmann, pp. 181-182. 
38Niebuhr, Resurrection, pp. 77-7f 
J,Ibid. 
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Moltmann has found such an alternative to historicism within the 
theological and the historiographic communities which he believes will 
properly deal with the resurrection event. This is the optimistic, 
future-oriented analogy principle resulting from an eschatological 
understanding of the reality of the resurrection, maldng use of the 
principles of Wolfhart Pannenberg, and a subsequent eschatological 
view of history, which will be discussed in Chapters III and IV below. 
By beginning with the New Testament itself Moltmann comes to this 
conclusion: 
The historian who enquires into the reality of the resurrection 
of Jesus is confronted in the biblical texts not only by realities 
Qf history, but also with a different outloC:>k on the experience 
and significance of history, which sets the event here re-
counted in a different light. The experience of history which 
is expressed in the historical approach is here confronted not 
merely by events which are more or less wel1 testified, more or 
less imaginatively embellished, but this experience of history 
is also confronted by a different experience of history. Hence 
the historical question as to the reality of the resurrection 
recoils upon the historical enquirer and cal.ls in question the 
basic experience of history which is the ground of his historical 
enquiry. The historical question as to the historicity of the 
resurrection of Christ is thereby expanded to include the 
questionability of the historical approach to history as such.46 
So right in the New Testament, at theology's fountain and source, 
Mol.tma.nn finds the key that unlocks the hermeneut.ical door, but not in 
a way that makes apologetics impossible, for he is dealing with a cul-
tural, though non-positivistic, principle of historical analogy. Not 
only has Moltma.nn made a negative remark about the historical explan-
ation of the resurrection, he has in fact made a negative remark about 
40.Moltma.nn, PP• 174-175. 
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all that the modern world has commonly called historical explanation. 
He says it is questionable. But this does not mean that he is ready 
to set history aside. He is only willing to set positivistic histor-
icism aside. Moltmann still refuses to accept the subjection of gen-
erally recognized standards of inquiry to the faith of the church, and 
he finds Niebuhr's methods inadequate to explain the event of Jesus' 
resurrection (the first because it was subject to Mildenberger 1s 
criticism; the second because he preferred the eschatologi.cal point of 
contact to the "non-natural" yet historical). So he begins where 
Albert Schweitzer departed, with the eschatological understanding of 
history as a method more homogeneous with Christian theology, still 
capable of being comprehended by the community outside the church, 
filled with the category of the new and the different, the categories 
Qf promise, expectation, and hope. 
The Eschatological Problem 
In addition te historical analogy and the peculiar problems arising 
i'rom the historical question of the resurrection, Moltmann presents his 
new approach to the impasse most clearly in the area of the eschatological 
theme in the Bible. Albert Schweitzer had pointed out that this theme 
was central to the message of Jesus and of the entire New Testament. 
The basic content of the theme was the expectation of the return of 
Jesus as the Son of Man at which time the kingdom of God would begin 
as a universal condition rather than a community's hope. Schweitzer 
held that the failure of the parousia during the apostolic generation 
meant that the eschatolegy of the New Testament had been invalidated. 
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This judgment was accepted by the exponents of "liberal" theology and 
the "religious-historical school" (Religionsgeschichtlicheschule) .41 
The effect upon hermeneutics was the removal of eschatological consid-
erations from serious theology and the quest for a cultural point of 
contact. In other words, historicism had laid claims to the future as 
well as the past. If theology was going to accept the principle of 
historicism as scientifically validated it would have to remove the 
religious element, the "God talk," from the sphere of history past, 
present, and future.42 
Carl Braaten claims that eschatology is incredible to modern man.43 
Nevertheless, it is central to Jesus and the New Testament. Theologians 
are responsible for the hermeneutical task of explaining how that 
eschatology is relevant to our time. 
Few theologians have agreed with Schweitzer. Somewhat piously 
they have assumed that what is so central to the New Testament 
must still somehow be relevant to our time. It is as if they 
had their hands on a cord attached to a powerful electric 
generator, but haven't found where to plug it in. That iZ-4 
what we mean by the need for a cultural point of contact. 
11 Pannenberg, Johannes Metz, and others" have made many similar 
statements. They realize that the classical dogmatic treatment of 
eschatology has been to append that doctrine to their systems under 
the heading of "The last Things" (Johann Gerhard), or it has been 
41 Leonhard Goppelt, "The Easter Kerygma in the New Testament," 
The Easter Message for Today, translated by Salvator Attanasio and 
Darrell Guder (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1964), p. JO. 
42Ibid. 
43 Carl E. Braaten, "Toward a Theology of Hope" New Theology /15 
edited by ~artin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 
p. 95. 
44rb·, 
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dechronologized so that every critical situation is viewed an eschato-
logical (Kierkegaard, C.H. Dode, and the Bultmann school). Speaking 
to this problem, Johannes Metz urges theologians not to reduce eschato-
logy to a part of their theology but to understand it radically as "the 
determining factor in all theological statements. 1145 For Metz the "cul-
tural point of contact" was, at least experimentally, the process 
philosophy of the universe. Eschatology, then, is theology's statement 
about the process which is so central to all of life. "It is only in 
the eschatological horizon that the world appears as a becoming reality 
whose development is entrusted to the freedom of man."4' 
Moltmann sees the connection between the kind of eschatology 
that these theologians are calling for and the promise and hope scheme 
which is central to the history of Israel. He also sees the connection 
between the static view of the world presented by historicism and 
/ 
existentialism and the static idea of the Greek Kc<f'P.O S as the 
epiphany of the eteznal present, the appearance of truth.47 As a result, 
Moltmann finds that he cannot work with any static concept of eschatology 
or of the world, but, beginning with the New Testament history itself, 
in order to start the henneneutical task over again, he can approach 
his material directly, using eschatology itself as a key to the Scriptures. 
45 Johannes Metz "Creative Hope" New Theology edited by Martin 
Marty and Dean Pee~n (New York, Macmillan, 1,,a), V, 135. 
4,Ibid. 
47Moltmann, pp. 40- 41. 
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If Pannenberg and Moltmann are right we will again have to 
endure the tedium of another effort to activate the meaning 
of eschatology, and try to understand it, because without 
biblical eschatology nothing r~ains that deserves to be 
called "the biblical message." 
The impasse which Moltma.nn reached may be summarized as follows: 
on the one hand, the principle of analogy used by the historicists was 
too limited to deal with biblical interpretation; on the other hand, for 
theology to be understood outside of the church, it was necessary to 
use that principle. Moltmann's approach was to separate the methedology 
of historicism from its metaphysical assumptions and to apply the prin-
ciple of analogy under new presuppositions. Moltmann calls these pre-
suppositions the "eschatological understanding of history." The 
methodology he calls "analogy for the future." They may be described, 
respectively, as dynamic historicism and a dialectical-critical method, 
or antithesis criticism. Both Moltmann's understanding of history 
and his methodology will be studied in detail in the next two chapters. 
48Braaten, XXIII, ,5. 
CHAPTER III 
SOLUTIONS OFFERED IN THEOLCGY OF HOPE 
History of Traditions 
The previous chapter dealt with Jurgen Moltmann's problem, that 
hermeneutics had been captured by historicism. Now our discussion 
must turn away from the problem M:>ltmann faced, and to which he intended 
to minister in Theology of Hope, to the solutions he offers in that 
work. In this chapter the emphasis is on Moltmann's methodological 
tools for solving the problem, especially his use of the discipline of 
.. 
Uberlieferungsgeschichte, which has been translated both as "history 
of traditions" and "history of the transmission of tradition, 11 the 
latter with a view toward the process of the evolution of traditional 
themes. In this study the words of the first translation are employed 
with a view to brevity, but they should be taken as conveying the con~ 
tent of the second translation. In the next chapter the emphasis will 
shift from methodology to Moltma.nn's philosophical basis for hermen-
eutics, especially his radical eschatology. 
The question of continuity in the New Testament as a prototype of the 
hermeneutical gap 
The biblical interpreter is confronted by continuity gaps 
throughout the practice of his discipline. There are the gaps between 
-JO 
the Old and New Testaments, between the "historical Jesus" and the 
"resurrected Lord," between the disciples that travelled with Jesus and 
the apostles who founded the church, and between the Hel lenistic church 
and the thought world of the interpreter himself. Of all these questions, 
Moltma.nn makes most of the gap between Jesus before His death and the 
L0rd of the church. Although he treats all the gaps in Theology of Hope, 
this one forms the microcosm for the others in which ~bltmann the problem-
solver becomes manifest. For example, Moltmann recognizes that the 
faith of the church must somehow be related to the life and thought of 
Jesus of Nazareth; that Jesus cannot be a mere x to the historian. It 
is no wonder today that we find an article entitled "Did Jesus believe 
in God?111 
The problem here described is one of continuity. Moltmann, like 
R. F. Aldwinckle, poses a critique for the school of Bultmann. Rudolf 
Bultmann apparently saw no problem in by-passing any historical discontinuity 
between Jesus and the church, but the existentialist theologians ~ave 
made several attempts to answer Aldwinckle's question. Gunther Bornkamm, 
for example, sought a new revelation given to the post-Easter disciples; 
Gerhard Ebeli~g and Ernest Fucps tried to find evidence for the incipient 
kerygma in the teachings of Jesus.2 They found the key to continuity in 
their concept of "faith as a word-event. 113 They believe that what uniq~ely 
came to expression in Jesus was faith. 1he faith of Jesus, when imitated 
1 R. F. Aldwinckle, "Did Jesus Believe in God?" New Theology 
edited by, Martin .l'larty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1,68), V. 76 . 
2Leonhard Goppelt, "The Easter Kerygma in the New Testament," 
The Easter Message for Today, translated by Salvator Attanasio and 
Darrell Guder (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1964), pp. J2-JJ. 
Jcarl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: West-
minister Press, 1,66), p. 71. 
31 
in the faith of the disciples, epened the latter to the future as Jesus 
was o~en t0 it, and it caused them to share God's love as Jesus had 
shared it.4 They explained faith thus: man receives the Word, a language 
event in which the speaker communicates himself in love. The faith 
which is awakened is the only evidence necessary to establish the lan-
guage event as the Word of God.5 But such approaches fall short of the 
sort of evidence far which Moltmann is searching. Word and faith come 
inte being and leave it again all in the realm of subjectivity . For 
Bultmann and his disciples it must be so, as was noted in Chapter II, 
because subjectivity is the only field of human knowledge that is not 
under the thrall of historicism. Ebeling and Fuchs use the principle 
of analogy this way and come to this conclusion. Hence any continuity 
established only on the faith of Jesus is not historical, and therefore 
it is too small for Moltmann. 
The key to the historical problem, as demonstrated above, is the 
resurrection. Evidence for the resurrection consists of the reports of 
the empty tomb, the Easter appearances of Jesus, and the sending of the 
Holy Spirit. The appearance were, notably, only to these wha were Jesus' 
disciples, just as the meanings of the parables were revealed only to 
the disciples. A message was connected with each appearance. And 
finally, the resurrection occurred "according to the Scriptures," 
that is, it fit in with the hopes and expectations of the Jews. 
4Ibid. 
5Jghn B. Cobb, "A New Trio Arises in Europe", New Theolog,v 
edited by Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1,,5), 
V, 25,. 
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l-bltmann is not the first to seek the continuity in the event of 
the resurrection itself as seen in its ap0calyptic context. Ernst 
Kasemann has tried. to "rehabilitate" the apocalyptic themes which 
Albert Schweitzer had shown to be the cruz of Jesus' message, and which 
Schweitzer later eschewed as incampatible with present thought. 6 Speak-
ing to this impasse brought about by Schweitzer's analysis, Leonhard 
Goppelt had made an especially clear statement: 
This lonely resurrection would be a meaningless miracle had 
it been experienced by any other man, a rabbi or a proppet. 
For the disciples, however, it is substantiated on the basis 
of an understanding of faith. They knew Jesus from their 
discipleship of the earthly days as Him through whom God 
effected His eschatological redemption. Even more they 7 knew Him as the one Who in His Person is the Promised One. 
By pointing to the category of promise, Goppelt has brought the 
entire Old Testament into focus on the resurrection event. \o./hereas 
Existentialist exegets had divorced apocalyptic themes from the Old 
.. 
Testament, finding yet another breach of continuity, Oberliefer-
u"e:sgeschichte joins the ends of the gap by concentrating (at least 
at one period of its development in the early works of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, R. Rendtorff, et al.) on the promise-fulfillment scheme of 
8 the Old Testament. Pannenberg makes the further claim that 
9Braaten, p. 171 
7aoppelt, p. 51 
8Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Redemptive :b.vent and History," Essays on 
~ Testament Hermeneutics, translated by Shirley Guthrie, edited by 
Claus Westermann (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1,60), pp. 321-322. 
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The eschatology of the New Testament is no more a radical 
break with the historical consciousness of Israel than that 
of the Apocalyptist. Jesus made the hope of salvation depend 
on a relationship to His Person rather than the Torah, and 
this is the radical break with the Old Testament. As far 
as the understanding of reality is concerned, the N;w 
Testament is in fundamental agreement with the Old. 
So the study of apocalyptic traditions fonns the basis of the 
continuity between Jesus and the early church and between the testaments. 
Moltmann makes use of Pannenberg 's material here and throughout his 
Theology of Hope, so much so that one or two quotes would never do 
justice to the picture Moltmann presents. But there is one unique 
contribution to the continuity question which Moltmann offers. This 
is the "eschatology of the crass." This, z.ioltma.nn claims, is what is 
uniquely Christian about New Testament eschatology, and also uniquely 
historical. He examines the contradiction between the cross of Jesus 
and the resurrection, and finds continuity in the contradiction itself. 
Between the expectations of late Jewish apocalyptic and 
Christian eschatolegy stands the cross of Jesus. Hence 
all Christian resurrection eschatology bears the mark of 
an eschatologia crucis. That is more than merely a break 
in the coherent historic tradition of apocalyptic expecta-
tions. The contradiction of the cross permeates also the 
whole existence, liflb and theological thinking of the 
Church in the world. · 
The contradiction which began with the cross and resurrection did 
not disappear with the Easter appearances of Jesus. That same contra-
diction lies deep within the life of the Church, in the first century, 
'Ibid. 
18Jurgen Moltmann, Theolo'j: of Hope, tra nslated by James Leitch, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1,,5~ p. SJ. 
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and ever since. Moltmann explains that 
The trend towards the Catholicism in the life and thought of 
the ancient Church is plain. The ecstacy of eschatological 
ful.fi.llment in the Christ event is the presupposition for this 
process of the transformation of Christianity into an ecstatic 
form of Hellenistic mystery religien and into an ecumenical 
world Church. This form of "presentative eschatology" ••• 
can be called an eschatologia gloriae, if it is still possible 
to comprehend it in eschatological categories at all. 11 
In the above paragraph Moltmann has used some exegetical jargon. 
By "Catholicism" he means the theology of the Pastoral epistles, of 
James, Second Peter, and certain select passages in the Fourth Gospel 
which Bultmann claimed were later additions to that Gospel. This 
Early Catholicism consisted of a Christianity that had been cultified 
as a result of Hellenization. For example, the category of Messiah 
had receded in favor of "the Lord," with kyrios not signifying adonai 
or fl 1fl" as it does in Paul, but signifying the prince of a spiritual 
empire. The devotion once given only to the quasi-deified Caesar had 
been transferred to a Hellenized version of the Great Eschatological 
Prophet. As Bultmann described "Early Catholicism," worship consisted 
in celebration 0f the epiphany of Christ, "which title now signified a 
hypestasis of God in which the believer could participate through 
Baptism." Moltmarin finds in the epistles of Paul an attempt to combat 
the "presentative eschatology" of the "Early Catholics, 11 an effort in 
which Paul was not ultimately successful. Holtmann says, 
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But now, the polemic in which Paul attacks Hellenism is 
marked both by a new recognition of the significance of 
the cross of Christ and also by a new recognition of a 
truly futuristic eschatology, and thus becomes a criti-
cism 8f presentative eschatology as such •••• This 
does not refer to mere repetition or tiresome relics of 
late Jewish apocalyptic in Paul, but means his own 
apocalyptic, which is kindled by an eschatology of the 
cross and is therefore hostile to every eschatological 
ecstacy of fulfillment.12 
So Moltmann bases his approach to the problem of continuity between 
Jesus of Nazareth and the early Church en this very contradiction: 
the eschatology of the cross, the unity of the crucified with the 
resurrected, and the suffering-hoping community which is faithful 
to the crucified and risen Lord. 
Against the uniting of the believer with the dying and 
rising Lord of the cultus a~er the fashion of the 
mysteries Paul asserts an eschatological distinction: 
baptism is the means of participating in the Christ 
event of the crucifixion and death of Christ. Fellow-
ship with Christ is fellowship in suffering with the 
crucified Christ. The baptized are dead with Christ, 
it they are not already risen with him and translated 
into heaven in the perfect tense of the cultus. They 
attain participation in the resurrected by new obedience, 
which unfolds ~tself in the realm of the hope of the 
resurrection. 1 
So Moltmann's Pauline eschatology of the cross is, to 
Moltmann's essay of thinking, futuristic, bringing hope to an other-
wise cheerless present. This hope leads the believer into "the 
tensions and antitheses of obedience and suffering in the world."14 
12Ibid., pp. 1,0-1,1. 
13Ibid., p. 1,1. 
14Ibid. 
Antithesis is a key concept in Moltmann's hermeneutical approach to the 
New Testament. He does not view contradiction as a disruption of con-
tinuity, but as a dialectical pole that forms part of an historical 
pattern. Moltmann finds continuity between Christ's own contradiction 
of his present and the believer's contradiction of his. The resurrec-
tion serves as God's vindication ef Christ's contradiction, just as the 
future will serve as God's vindication of the believer I s. Around this 
view of the power of the future Moltmann has constructed a theology, 
usi~ philosophical categories b~rrowed from an extremely dynamic 
form of dialectical materialism as represented by the work of Ernst 
Bloch. 
¥JG>ltmann I s resultant "eschatological understanding of history" 
will De discussed in further detail in the second section of Chapter 
IV below. The chief concern here is to shew how Moltmann uses the con-
cept of contra~ction in his exegetical methodolegy. In this case, by 
the concept of the eschatolcgy of the cross, he brings together the 
Risen Lord and the crucified Jesus. Moltmann even thinks of his escha-
tology as a means to take history seriously, for he says, 
only an eschatology of promise can overcome (the epiphany 
religion) mythical and illusionary view of the world and 
of human existence, because it alone takes the trials, the 
contradictions, and the godlessness of the world seriously 
in a meaningful way, because it makes faith and obedience 
possible in the world not by regarding the contradictions 
as of n• account, buy 8Y enabling us to believe and obey 
on the ground of ou, hope in the overcoming of these con-
tradictions by God. 5 
15~., p. 1(..3. 
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Having bridged the ancient gap between Jesus and the Risen Lord, 
Moltmann also uses the concept of dialectical continuity to bridge 
the modern hermeneutical gap between the thoughts world of the New 
Testament and the Church to whom the modern preacher must minister. 
The Lord is the same. The contradictions between His death and His 
resurrection are "an inherent part of his identity. 1116 The church 
today is identified with the mission of Jesus, and the mission of the 
apostles. History today is determined by the future of Jesus Christ. 
In the resurrection this future was revealed, and now it stands before 
the Church on its mission as an object of hope. 17 
The history of traditions, data, and analogy 
The history of traditions, or the history of the transmission 
of traditions (Uberlieferungsgeschichte) is the hermeneutical disci-
pline whereby traditional sources of theology are interpreted according 
to the principles of modern historical research with a special intent 
to investigate the continuity and development of salvation-historical 
themes throughout the various. periods of universal history. This dis-
cipline is based on the presupposition that all fields of human know-
ledge are related. Regardless of the findings of "higher criticism, 11 
1 
'Ibid. , p. 201. 
l?Ibid., p. 212. 
-
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the traditions themselves are historical facts. They belong to the 
.. 
realm of empirical data. Moltmann uses the discipline of Uberliefer-
ungsgeschichte as a methodological t&ol, applying Wolfhart Pannenberg 1s 
principle that "what is learned from science and philosophy, as well as 
world history, must be integrated with what is learned from Scripture 
and the Christ event. 11 18 The problem with the principle of analogy 
which was discussed in Chapter II above arose largely because the sphere 
of theology had been isolated from other spheres of inquiry. By 
accepting Pannenberg 1 s principle of mutual relevance between sacred and 
secular knowledge, Moltmann is, methodologically, able to rise above 
those "walls erected from the time of Kant to protect the sphere of 
theology from other spheres of inquiry," 1' and apply the infonnation 
gained from this hermeneutical vantage point to interpret the Scriptures. 
It has been said that Moltmann is dependent on Pannenberg in the same 
way that Bultmann was dependent on Heidegger. 
There is some truth to the contention that Pannenberg is "busy 
constructing the philosophical underpinnings for the theology of hope, 1120 
but one must remember that Pannenberg is himself a theologian rather than 
a philosopher. He is also involved in biblical interpretation, hence 
"philesophical underpinnings" does not mean that "philosophical under-
18 Cobb, p. 263. 
1
'Ibid. 
20Richard J. Neuhaus, 11Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a Theologian," 
Theology and the Kingdom of God, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 19&9), 
p. 1~. 
pinnings" does not mean the same thing as what Braaten called a 
"cultural point of contact." In other words, the relationship between 
Pannenberg and f.x>ltma.nn is not the same as that between Heidegger and 
Bultmann, between a cultural philosopher and a theologian-disciple 
who makes the philosophy the basis for his hermeneutical analogy. 
Moltmann is not a disciple of Pannenberg, but a brother theologian 
who is willing to acknowledge his colleague's principles as valuable, 
and to use them as a point of departure for solutions to his own 
hermeneutical and eschatological questions. 
So far, Moltmann's solutions have been sought mostly in negating 
methodological procedures of the historicists: the distance between 
"subject" and "object," the separation between language and event, 
Historie and Geschichte, or fact and meaning. Wben one investigates 
Yioltmann's use of Pannenberg's principles, however, he does find a pos-
itive statement about the former's own hermeneutics, which are being 
studied here. The point where Pannenberg and Moltma.nn agree is stated 
as follows: "The event of Jesus is not only the chief paradigm in the 
consciousness of the Christian believer, but public evidence available 
in history and having a claim on reason's effort to conceive the struc-
ture of reality. 1121 
It was noted above in Chapter II that Moltmann had found a method 
of hermeneutical investigation which went beyond the historicists' use 
of the principle of analogy i n helping him to theologize. This method 
21 Ibid., p. 37. 
-
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begins with the history of traditions. It goes beyond Niebuhr's two 
alternatives mentioned in Chapter II, but it accepts one heretofore un-
mentioned idea of Niebuhr's; namely, that the path of theological know-
ledge must begin with historical particulars, then move to the universal 
and eschatological.22 Niebuhr had said that the crucifixion and resurrec-
tion traditions occupy an "unassailable centrality" in the form. of the 
entire New Testament history.23 Moltmann agrees that these events are the 
starting point for investigating the New Testament. From this point the 
road leands outward to the context, in agreement with Pannenberg's 
procedure; 
All theological questions and answers are meaningful only 
within the framework of the history which God has with 
humanity and through humanity with His whole creation--the 
history moving toward a future still hidden from the world 
but already revealed in Jesus Christ.24 
And here the question might arise whether God and His acts are really 
the subject matter of the historian. At least one important modern · 
philosopher of history, R. G. Collingwood, has denied the status of 
history to traditions involving God. Pannenberg has taken Collingwood 
to task for his contention. Moltmann does not come to grips with 
Collingwoed's contention in Theology of Hope, but he assumes, as Pannen-
berg has done, that the traditions are data. 
22Moltrnann, P• 141. 
23R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1,57), P· 73. 
24Pannenberg, P• 314. 
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The path of theological knowledge finds a center in the Holy Scriptures, 
then moves outward to wider and wider contexts, using material from each 
wider context, but interpreting all of it in the light of the center. 
For Moltmann, (not necessarily for Pannenberg), this center is the 
"future of Jesus Christ." 
The centre of the New Testament scriptures is the future of 
the risen Christ, which they announce, point forward to, and 
promise. Thus if we are to understand the biblical scriptures 
in their proclamation, their understanding of existence and 
their understanding of the worldA then we must look in the same 
direction as they themselves do.G5 
In the first century context, Moltmann points to two facts that surround 
the event of Jesus Christ, that his God was Yahweh, and that He was a 
Jew. 'l'herefor.e the proper interpretation of the New Testament is the 
investigation of its continuity with and contradiction to the Old 
Testament. 2' The Old Testament, in turn, is investigated using history 
of traditions, and as a result the theme of promise and fulfillment is 
singled out for its continuity in New Testament-theology. This will be 
explained more completely in the first section of Chapt~r "IV. 
The next wider context is the setting of the ancient church in 
which the New Testament Scriptures arose. At this point, it was ob-
served above, there was a continuity gap between the "historical Jesus" 
and the risen Christ. Carl Braaten, one of the earliest interpreters 
of both Moltmann and Pannenberg, in attempting to explain their view-
points has brought the gap down to the New Testament center when he states 
25Moltmann, p. 28). 
26Ibid • , p. 14 1 • 
a 
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The question of the continuity between the Easter kerygma and 
the historical Jesus ••• cannot be answered unless one grasps 
the connection between Jesus• own claim to authority an~ God's 
vindication of that claim by raising Him from the dead. 7 
Here, Braaten, without saying so, has already interpreted the continuity 
between the Old and the New Testaments, between the "historical Jesus" 
and the risen Christ, and between Jesus Christ and the earliest church 
according to Pannenberg and ~~ltmann's method of the history of tradi-
tions. He shows how Moltmann has picked up the promise--fulfillment 
theme, and developed the New Testament events under it using the 
nomenclature of 11 claim11 and "vindication." 
So far it has only been noted that the promise--fulfillment theme 
is a major tradition of the Old Testament that carries over into the 
.. 
New. It would appear that Uberlieferungsgeschichte is being employed 
according to what was called the "first translation" above at the 
beginning of this chapter. In the next chapter, using material from 
Walter Zimmerli and Gerhard von Rad, Moltmann will be shown as using 
.. 
Uberlieferungsgechichte the other way, as the history of the transmission 
of traditions, especially in the relationships between the prophets 
and the apocalypticists, and betw~en the apocalypticists and the 
apostles. But for the purposes of this chapter, this author wants 
to do justice to the material in Theology of Hope which comes close 
to, but does not settle on, using the promise--fulfillrnent scheme 
developed in Pannenberg 1 s earlier words, as a "philosophical underpinning" 
27Braaten, PP• 9J-94. 
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for 1-bltmann. Some of the "philosophical underpinning" is to be found 
in the following paragraph: 
Within the reality characterized by the constantly creative 
work of God, history arises because .God makes promises and 
fulfills these promises. History is event so suspended in 
tension between promise and fulfillment that through the 
promise it i~8irreversibly pointed toward the goal of r'ut:.ur~ fulfillment. 
According to this view, history is a series of events suspended between 
a divine promise and its fulfillment. What people think and do, especially 
what they think, within that tension, are the facts of history. Promise 
and fulfillment give direction to human thoughts. Collingwood, if he 
believed in promise and fulfillment, would say that these provide the 
"inside" of each event. It can be said that for Moltmann they provide 
the dynamic of all history. Since any distinction between subject and 
object, between sacred and secular, has already been ruled out, the 
activity of God in promising and fulfilling becomes the dynamic of 
universal history. 
'This is not Moltmann 's final word on the subject. There is 
another dynamic tension of cross and resurrection which, as mentioned 
before, provides a dialectical dimension td history for Moltrnann. But 
for the Biblical interpreter, this dialectical dimension is formed by 
promises and moves through to fulfil.Jm.ents. Certainly Neuhaus is only 
partly right when he claims that Pannenberg supplies the "philosophical 
underpinnings" for the Theology of Hope, but, as has been demonstrated, 
28 Pannenberg, p. 317. 
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Moltmann does use the promise--fulfillment theme in developing his 
biblical interpretations, and does so in a way that is basically in 
agreement with Pannenberg. 
Let us return to the Jewish context of the center of the i~ew 
Testament and investigate another direction in which the promise--ful-
fillment theme will lead. As was noted above in Chapter II, Albert 
Schweitzer brought an end to the old quest for the historical Jesus by 
pointing out the apocalyptic nature of Jesus' message. He found the 
center of Jesus' message to be its continuity with and difference 
from the intertestamental apocalyptic expectations. Of course, this 
apocalyptic tradition is a datum for the historian of traditions, and 
since Jesus was a first-century Jew it is also a portion of His irrunedi-
ate context, of His milieu. Every milieu has a leading edge which, 
Pannenberg develops as a "horizon of expectation." In Grundzlige der 
Christologie Pannenberg discussed apocalyptic themes according to this 
idea of a moving horizon. 29 Moltmann has found in that idea another 
"philosophical underpinning" for his theology of hope. 0uch a "horizon" 
is also a bridge; as, for example, in the words 
Without the horizon of apocalyptic expectation we could not 
grasp just why the man Jesus should be the final revelation 
of God, why in him and only in him ~od himself should have 
appeared •••• If this horizon should disappear, then the 
foundation of faith is lost, then Christology becomes myth-
ology, and it no longer ~s any continuity with Jesus or the 
witness of the apostles. 
29 Braaten, p. 102. 
30rbid. 
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Here we see the inner working of the history of traditions: a 
tradit ion is a public understanding and interpretation of some aspect 
of life. As these understandings and interpretations change, as they do 
whenever the milieu changes, public expectations of the future change in 
the same directions. History is never static, but the historian can iso-
late so small a segment of it that the amount of change is not a signifi-
cant factor in understanding it, just as a photographer's product is not 
influenced by the rotation of the earth. Thus the moving and changing 
public traditions of a given period can be isolated for investigation 
by the historian. The furthest possible range of public expectations 
within the segment selected for study constitutes the horizon, the limi t 
of vision. Specifically, the apocalyptic horizon of expectation was, in 
Jesus' day , the limit of public vision into the future. Apocalyptic 
tradition understood the resurrection of the dead as an end-time event. 
This fact is "an abiding presupposition of Jesus' significance for all 
later times, 1131 not only for Pannenberg, but alse for Moltmann and any 
other historian of traditions. 
Thus Braaten states 1foltmann I s conclusion, 
In post-exilic apocalypticism the idea of the resurrection of all 
the dead is an element in its theology of universal history •••• 
When the early Christians spoke of the resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth, as those who shared the apocalyptic expectations of a 
general resurrection of all the dead at the end of the world, 
they knew they were speaking eschatologically. The question 
they would ask is not whether the ·resurrection could happen, but 
-whether it had already happened. If it has happened, it is 
a world-historical event of eschatological significance.32 
This is history of traditions at work. This is the discipline 
.. 
referred to above by the "first translation" of Uberlieferungsgeschichte, 
the cataloging of themes and cross-referencing of items in the milieu. 
Here the interpreter selects his slice of history, in this case first 
century Judaism, isolates it from the rest of history, looks for a theo-
logical theme, in this case the resurrection, and examines the resur-
rection tradition. The first-century Jew expected a resurrection. The 
predication of a resurrection to Jesus, within that horizon of expecta-
tion, constituted an announcement that divine promises has been fulfilled 
in His very Person. This announcement also has significance today, though 
the horizon of expectation is different. For the modern interpreter 
of the New Testament the history of traditions has contributed an under-
standing of what might otherwise be a difficult part of the Christian 
message. Moltmann is greatly concerned to bridge the gap between the 
First Century in which the New Testament arose and the present time in 
which the interpreter must work. Again, he has used the history of tra-
ditions to span the chasm. One theme of the Old Testament is the link 
between promise and purpose, between call and mission. As Abraham was 
called, as the promise was announced to him, so was his mission. Like-
wise the prophets, receiving their calls, were sent to do a specific 
job. So it is with the "auditory visions" of the risen Christ. The 
32Ibid. 
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apostles are literally d.ft~ trtt>J.._.,'I , sent away from Christ to the 
world.t4oltmann says, 
The link between coming history and past history is provided 
in the light of this forward-moving, historic mission. The 
connection between then and now in the history of tradition 
is a connection in the history of promise and of mission; 
for tradition, as Christians understand it, means mission 
that moves forward and outward. The word-event in which 
past events are brought to expression means the event of 
being called to the future of salvation in Christ and to 
the present labour of hope in the service of reconciliation.33 
A word of explanation is warranted here. How does tradition mean 
mission? The term ff<!-f'jJ o<rt} in the writings of Paul refers to 
the content of the apostle's proclamation. Moltmann is assuming that 
his readers are familiar 'A·i th that term, and with that content; for 
Paul's proclamation, like his letters, can usually be divided into 
credenda and agenda. Just as the content of the Old Testament tradi-
tions dealt with a word to be proclaimed, a land to be possessed, a 
people to be called, a city to be warned, and various other agenda that 
accompany the promises themselves, so the Christian understands his 
tradition in the twentieth century in terms of agenda, that is, "the 
present labour of hope in the service of reconciliation. 11 
History of traditions can also be used in theological polemics. 
Moltmann uses it so early in Theology of Hope. Karl Barth had asserted 
that revelation had to be separated from Scripture in so far as Scrip-
ture was simply a written report, an historical datwn, something in the 
33 Moltmann, p. 284. 
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"objective" realm. Kreck applied this principle to the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit. Kreck actually separated revelation from the Holy Spirit. 
In reply, Moltmann points out that the Holy 0pirit, investigated by his-
tory of traditions, is Himself part of the event of Jesus Christ; He is 
"historical and eschatological. the Spirit of the resurrection of 
the dead. 1134 Consequently no one has the right to separate the Spirit 
from the Scripture, or "subjective" from "objective" revelation. 
So the first step in solving the problem, posed by the way the 
historicist school used the principle of analogy, was for Moltmann to 
find a methodology in which historically-conscious theology can inter-
pret the Holy Scriptures. Moltmann believes that the history of tra-
ditions serves that end. 
The theology of history with its "language of the facts" does 
not mean bruta facta, which present themselves to the positi-
vistic historian as the end-products abstracted from tradition, 
but means the divine "language of the facts in that context 
of tradition and expectation in which the events take place." 
In this sense, "history is always the history of traditions." 
(Geschichte is the German term). History of tradition is in 
fact to be regarded as the profounder term for history (Geschichte) 
as such. The events which reveal God must be taken in and with 
the context in tradition in which they took place and a1gng 
with which alone they have their original significance. 
This drives toward the center of Moltmann's theology of hope. It 
bridges the gaps in continuity, it answers Schweitzer's contention that 
34Ibid., pp. 56-5?. Kreck's identity has not yet oecome available 
to this writer. 
35Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
the "historical Jesus" is meaningless, and it provides a basis for 
apologetics and polemics. One more point needs to be made. The his-
tory of traditions also serves to lead Moltmann to his ontological 
understanding of eschatology as the dynamic of history. Here we get 
.. 
closer to the second translation of Uberlieferungsgeschichte, the 
"history of the transmission of tradition, 11 or really, of the "handing 
down" of the "downhanded." 
Applying this history of the transmission of tradition to the Old 
Testament porphetic books, Moltmann is led to the following observa-
tions: 
The message of these (classical) prophets arises in the shadow 
of the increasing menace from Assyria, Babylon, and Persia, the 
gathering storm of destruction that broods over the national, 
political, and Palestinian life of Israel's existence and ef the 
whole history of promise and fulfillment thus far vouchsafed to 
Israel by God. They interpret this histoJl of collapse as 
Yahweh's judgment on his apostate people. 
One might be tempted to stop at this point and accuse M:olt{(lann of 
confusing trend analysis with proclamation, but as one reads on he 
sees the deeper, tradition-historical analysis that he really has 
in store for his readers. He says, for example, 
This means that the new historic action of Yahweh in the 
history of nations, which for Israel becomes the history 
of its destruction, is seen by then as being on the same 
level as, and even competing with, the historic acts of 
Yahweh in thei5 own past as remembered in the cultus and 
the festivals. 7 
J'Ibid., p. 127. 
37rbid __, 
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Here one might expect to find an existential or crisis-theological 
answer, but Moltmann continues, 
This new, and as yet dark and unfathomable action of Yahweh 
will even go to the length of outreaching and replacing his 
past actions upon his people. In the historic judgment of 
Israel, Yahweh not only annuls the debts of Israel, but'·he 
annuls also the institutions of his o~ covenant in his un-
fathomable freedom to adopt new ways. 
So the message of doom from the classical prophets of Israel, 
interpreted by the history of the transmission of traditions, pro-
claims further promises which place hope before the hearers and ex-
tend the horizon of their expectations into the future. The de struc-
tion becomes a sign of the eschaton, hope remains in effect, and ful-
fillment is not conswmnated, but made even more universal and eschato-
logical than in the previous form of the tradition. 
To summa.rize Noltmann's methodological solution, the discipline 
of "history of traditions" uses data which are comprehensible outside 
of the theologians subculture while remaining amenable to the eschato-
logical content of the traditions it studies. By placing the traditions 
in dialogue with one another, Moltmann has fashioned a hermeneutical 
tool to help bridge the gaps that break the continuity of the Bible. 
Moreover, Moltmann takes seriously the contradictions implicit in the 
gaps, especially the contradiction between the cross and the risen 
Christ. These antitheses are the matter which f'ioltmann's dialectical-
critical method treats. Because the history of traditions includes 
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the study of past horizons of expectation, the partial fulfillments, 
and the "over-spills," it is adequate for a dialectical' understanding 
of history. 
CHAPTER IV 
::,OLUTIONS OFFERED IN THEOLOGY OF HOPE 
Eschatology 
The content of the traditions 
In the previous chapter Jurgen Moltmann's procedure of history of 
traditic;,ns was explained. In this chapter the content of those tra-
ditions will be sifted in order to uncover what for Moltmann is their 
precious kernel, namely eschatology. Since Holtmann is not a biblical 
scholar himself, but a systematician, he relies on Gerhard von Rad and 
Walter Zimmerli for mast of his Old Testament exegesis. The author 
has also had recourse to von Rad and Zimmerli in order to examine 
Moltmann's use of his exegetical sources. This will become evident from 
the citations in this chapter. In the portion of this chapter that 
deals with the apocalyptic tradition, this author has relied on D.S. 
Russell for background information. 
Just what is it in the content of the traditions which Moltmann 
studies that fonns the basis of his e:xp4nation of history? What is 
the underlying scheme that supports his historical hermeneutics? The 
answer in Theology of Hope is clear: the traditions are based on Yah-
d the Various fulfillments experienced by Israel, each weh's promises an 
h. · t w hope for a new "horizon of new fulfillment carrying wit in l. a ne 
Promise-fulfillment scheme is the hermeneutical expectation." This 
t of the Old Testament. key to the his ory 
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Moltmann accepts Zirnmerli's analysis of the promise traditions in 
the Torah. These might be briefly summarized as follows: The Abra-
hami tic promise goes beyond the possession of the land and the increase 
of the patriarch's descendants. A fullness of blessing is announced 
for the history of Israel, a wholeness that constitutes a universal 
counter-history to the world-wide history of curse begi nning in Genesis 
1 J , As far back as the patriarchs the Yahwist has a lready sown the 
seeds of tension that force the post-conquest Israelite to look into 
the future for a greater realization of the promise. The Priestly 
account of the same event frames the Abrahamitic promise in covenant 
terms by pla cing here the fonnulary promise, 11 I will be your God, 11 
though reserving for the exodus account the corrollary, "You shall be 
my people." As was the case with the Yahwist, so with the Priests the 
promise-fulfillment tension does not end with the conquest of the land.2 
. . 
According to Zinunerli's presentation of the promise and fulfillment 
scheme, the will of God becomes event in the following: 
All Old Testament history, insofar as it is history guided and 
given by Yahweh's word, receives the character of the fulfill-
ment; but in the fulfillment it receives a new character as 
promise) 
1Walter L.immerli, "Promise and Fulfillment, 11 translated by James 
Wharton, Essays on Old 'festament Hermeneutics (Richmond: John Knox 
Press, 1%&), pp. ,2-,J. This work, copyrighted by M. E. Bratcher, 1,&3, 
was originaliy published as Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik 
(Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960). 
2Ibid. 
3Jurgen Moltmann, 1heolo,: of Hope, t ranslated by James W. Leitch 
(New York, Harper & Row, 1,,1~ p. 10,. 
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M::>ltmann using almost the same scheme, attributes this "look into 
the future" inherent in every fulfillment to an "overspill that points 
to the future"4 which remains after every fulfillment event. For Holt-
mann, who views the Old Testament promise traditions from the "horizon 
of expectation standpoint," promise becomes the hermeneutical key to 
history and the events (Geschehen) that take place in history (Geschichte). 
Moltmann says, 
It could perhaps be said that the promises enter into ful-
fillment in events, yet are not completely resolved in any 
event, but there remains an overspill that points to the 
future. That is why reality (\-Jirklichkeit) as is comes and 
is awaited and as it passes and is left behind, is experienced 
as histon (Geschichte), and not as a cosmic and ever-recurring 
constant.' 
The result of this "oversphill" (Vberschuss) is that each generation 
of theologians has new eschatological homework to do as well as new his-
torical data to incorporate into his corpus of promise tradition. He 
must bring the new horizon of expectation to bear on the traditions; 
this task is called "hermeneutics." He must also bring the promise 
traditions to bear on the new horizon of expectation; this task is 
called "eschatology." Moltmann gives us an example of "eschatologian-
hermeneuticians" at work in Theology of~ by comparing and contrasting 
the eschatology of the prophets with that of the apocalypticists, seeking 
"systematic consequences" for modern eschatology., 
4z· li 1.mmer , p. 112. 
5Moltmann, p. 10~. 
•Ibid., p. 135 
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Prephetic eschatology 
For his analysis of the content of the prophetic traditions 
Meltmann relies on von Rad's investigation, especially on his magnum 
opus, Old Testament Theology. This does not mean that von Rad and 
Moltmann are in essential agreement about everything they treat. Von 
Rad is much less sure of what he means by "eschatology" than Moltmann, 
and he usually hedges the term about with qualifications. But both 
are concerned about history, and both work with the horizon concept. 
According to von Rad, 
The message of the prophets has to be termed eschatological 
wherever it regards the old historical bases of salvation 
as null and void. But we ought then to go on and limit the 
term. It should not be applied to cases where Israel gave 
a general expression of her faith in her future, or, as does 
happen, in the future of one of her sacred institutions. The 
prophetic teaching is only eschatological when the prophets 
expelled Israel from the safety of the old saving actions 
and suddenly shi~ed the basis of salvation to a future action 
of God.? 
In other words, the horizon of expectation moved beyond another hill, 
the future of Israel was no longer dependent on the Davidic kingship, 
or the Temple worship, or the pilgrimages, but would be open to new 
ways of fulfillment after the purgatorial period. 
But prophetic eschatology is not only the continuing vision of the 
passing away of the Old and the coming of the New. The promise is part 
of the old tradition: the God who promises i s the God who has promised. 
Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theolog,y_, translatea· b o 1· G 
( & L ) - Y • 'I. • Stalker New York: Harper Row, 1~G5, II, 118. 
-The prophets of Israel, therefore, related the future actions of God to 
the promise traditions. Von Rad calls the prophetic message a "great 
continuing dialogue" with the election traditions. 8 
On the one hand, we see with what for ce and ardour the prophets 
catch up these election traditions in their preaching; on the 
other, their relationship to them is a broken one; for they re-
gard the coming judgment a s sealing the end ef Israel's present 
existence; the secur.ity given her by the election traditions is 
cancelled out by her guilt. The only thing she can hold on to 
is a new historical act on the part of Yahweh, the outlines of 
which the prophets already see, and to which they point with 
kindled emotions., 
Such a message fulfills the requirements than von Had had so cauti ously 
set to make a proclamation eschatological. Von Rad goes on to indicate 
the other side of the dialogue: that the forms of the new act of Yahweh 
are taken from the election traditions.1° But the preaching of the proph-
ets would have been eschatological whether the new acts were similar to 
the form of the old or not. The essential thing to note is that the 
promise was not fully complemented by any past election event. Moltmann 
has peinted out that the question in the mind of Israel was "Where has 
the 'God of the promise I revealed His faithfulness ?u 11 He agrees tha t the 
classical prophets were answering that question when they cast their 
specific eschatology. He relies on von liad's exegesis, to show how 
"that classical prophecy is a specific characteristic of I sraelite be-
lief in the promise. 1112 
8Ibid., II, 117. 
c;Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
11 Moltmann, p. 43 
12Ibid., p. 125. 
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Previously in this paper the judgment announced by the prophets 
was referred to as "purgatorial." Perhaps this tenn was unfortunate, 
insofar as it can be misinterpreted in an over-individualistic or 
particularistic way. Moltmann does not see the judgment of Israel as 
• purgation of individuals, or even of a culture whose only corruption 
is in what the Scholastics would have called "accident. 11 The prophets 
themselves hardly offer the opportunity for such an interpretation within 
their writings. Even the "remnant 11 passages prefer the image of the 
truncated stump to any kind of cleansing imagery, and Amos even pictures 
the remnant as the barely-recognizab~e scraps left over from a lion's 
meal (J:12). Nevertheless, there is hope in the eschatology of the 
classical prophets. Moltmann says 
This judgment certainly means the annihilation of the people 
and of the history to which this people owes its existence, 
but it does not mean the annihilation of Yahweh's faithful-
ness to himself. It can therefore be conceived as a judgmen~ 
that paves the way for something finally1~ew, and. as annihila-tian for the sake of greater perfection. 
The term "finally new" is important. For Holtmann, unlike von 
Rad, the truly eschatological is not announced unless there is a dim-
ension of ultimacy, of universality. The visions of the end which the 
prophets portray include the neighboring Gentiles as well as the people 
of Israel. Moltmann is willing to call the prophetic message "escha-
tological II only because of this aspect. 14 So, in the prophets, the ma-
terial from the election traditions is brought to bear on the new horizon 
lJibid., p. 12,. 
14Ibid. 
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of the annihil . 
ation of Israel as a 
nation. The resultant new traditions 
Present 
an eschatological hope not only Israel, but for the Gentiles as 
Well. 
Jewish Apocalyptic eschatology 
The field of Jewish Apocalyptic writings has not been so well 
described by modeni investigators as that of the Prophets. In many 
ways one can see Holtmann doing original work on this subject in Theolo-
gy of Hope. For some of his ideas he claims dependence on Pannenberg, 
for other dependence on Rolff Hendtorff. 
The chief reason that the Apocalyptic writings are reviewed in 
this paper is that they might be compared with the Prophetic writings 
in order to find what Holtmann calls the "systematic consequences" for 
modern eschatology. See .Moltma.nn believes that the modern theologian 
is in a similar position to the Apocalyptic writers, and that the tradl-
tion he has to work with is similar to the Prophetic tradition. Hence 
there is a practical lesson for the present-day interpreter in under-
standing the way the Apocalyptic writers used their material. 
Gerhard von Rad lists three main characteristics of Apocalyptic 
literature. There are dualism, transcendentalism, and secrecy.15 Its 
dualism is more chronological than topological. It does not consist so 
much in "heaven and earth" as in "the present (evil) age," and the 
coming time of goodness, righteousness, victory for those who love God, 
15 
von Rad, II, )01-JOJ. 
and punishment for those who oppose Him. Its transcendentalism does 
not completely exclude the earth. 1~ere are politi~al and social conse-
quences on the earth that reflect the really important decisions which 
are being made else\·,here. Secrecy includes the elements of later 
Gno~ticism, the need for 11wisdorn 11 in order to understand ciphers and 
cryptic message. 1~is not the wisdom of Job, Ecclesiastes, or 
Proverbs, but rather the kind discussed in Rev. 13:18, the wisdom one 
needs to decipher the "numuer of the beast. 11 
It is significant that Apocalyptic writings never refer to 
themselves as 11prophecy. 11 They have no reot in the election traditions. 
They reveal no concern with Israel's history but rather with secular 
empires or even '"ith creation as a whole. Like the Ezekiel tradition, 
Apocalyptic has a "son of man" but he is a celestial being, not a 
prophet in any sense.16 
Lest too much emphasis be placed on the differences bet~een the 
Prophets and the Apocalypticists, it should be point~d out that both 
are unquestionably concerned with ethics. They encourage their read-
ers to behave in a prescribed way. Daniel (4:27) even seems to uni-
versalize theology and ethics.17 In Apocalyptic, however, the content 
is different, the encouragement is more toward ma.rtydom than toward 
reformation. 
1,Ibid . 
17n. S. Russell, The Method and Messa e of Jewish A ocal 
(Philadelphia: \,estminster, SCM Press, Ltd., 1,64 , p. 102. tic 
-In one impartant way -the Apocalyptic writers are closer to the 
Pharisees than to the classical prophets: they consider the written 
Torah to be the revelation of God to His people. This Torah is central 
to their thinking and conduct. 18 In The Manual of Discipline, Chapter I, 
of the Dead Sea literature we can see how an individual becomes 
apocalyptically bound to life in the Torah in the hope of eschatolog-
ical consequences for himself. 
Moltmann seizes upon the universal aspect to show how Apocalypticism 
developed from prophecy; 
But the more the new saving action of God that is to come out-
strips all analogies from the history of Israel's dealings with 
God in past experience and traditions, and the more the judg-
~ent that begins with Israel moves on through the history of 
the nations, the more clearly there appears the first signs of 
a universal eschatology of mankind. Here, however, we have 
presumably already the beginning of what must be called apocalyptic. 1' 
The Apocalyptic writers were the first to discribe a divine kingdom 
which was greater than Israel. It was a kingdom for "the righteous." 
Israel has a role to play in it, but is no longer synonymous with "the 
righteous." 
Von Rad, and even Pannenberg, look on Apocalyptic literature as 
"application of cosmological patterns to history." Here, 1-bltmann 
breaks with his acknowledged mentors. for Moltrnann Jewish Apocalyptic 
writers begin with eschatology, and then give "an eschatological and 
historic interpretation to the cosmos. 1126 He says, 
1 8Ibid. , p. 2,. 1, Moltmann., p. 130. 
26 lli.Q.., p. 13G. 
It might well be that the existing cosIIll.c bounds of reality 
which the moving historic horizon of the promise reaches in' 
eschatology, are not regarded as fixed and pre-de~ermined 
things, but are themselves to be founa in motion."- 1 
Such a statement .would be unthinkable for the existential theologians. 
Here one might identify Moltmann' s position with what Reinhold Niebuhr 
called "human destiny" and set his against what Niebuhr called "human 
nature. 11 If Moltmann's conclus ions are correct, man has no nature but 
only a destiny, similar to what Ortega-y-Gasset calls man's "history , 11 
and coming close to ~artrian 11self-determination11 for the physical as 
well as the social 11mankind. 11 This is a ground of hope at the price of 
all security. Such a doctrine not only set Moltmann against a theo-
logical interpretation of "human nature , 11 but against Carwin, Freud, 
Marx, and the Positivists as well. In fact it puts Holtmann very close 
to the American Fundamentalists if he follows through this vision of 
ultimacy and if one takes traditional biblical language to describe it. 
Underneath the newness of Moltmann's claim that the cosmic bounds 
of reality are in motion lies an answer to R.R. Niebuhr's riddle which 
was described in Chapter II above. There the discussion involved 
Moltma.nn's hesitation to accept the presuppositions of the dialectical 
theologians. R.R. Niebuhr had asked, "Can the tension in Christianity's 
historical consciousness •• , be resolved before that consciousness 
enters into the additional work of examining the conditions of its own 
awareness? 11 22 i' ioltmann answers "No. 11 The church must be aware that its 
21 Ibid. 
22R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), P• 34. 
consciousness is normed not by an investigation of nature bu~ by promise. 
It is formed not by understanding, but by hope. Although Moltmann is 
never quite clear as to whether he is posing an epistemological or a 
metaphysical question, or both, one must admit that his willingness to 
share first-century conceptuality in order to get at the eschatological 
core of the Apocalyptic message is remarkably unique. Different as it 
may be, however, it is a necessary step in understanding Apocalyptic, 
because, as he himself says, 
Only if the whole historical picture--contingency and con-
tinui ty--can be shown to be contingent should we come within 
sight of the eschatologically new fact of the resurrection 
of Christ. The resurrection of Christ does not mean a pos-
sibility for the world--for existence and for history. When 
the world is understoad as a contingent creation by God, then 
the resurrection becomes intelligible as a new creation. 23 
The analogy between Apocalyptic eschatology and that of l'ioltmann is 
something like this: the Apocalypticist ·saw in the future a new horizon 
of fulfillment for God's promises made to Israel; it embraced all nations 
as included in God's activity of blessing. Therefore the apocalyptic 
writers went beyond the Prophets in their preaching and writing. Today 
r-1oltmann sees a new horizon of fulfillment beyond that described in 
contemporary 1rword II or II faith II theology; so he needs new terms to de-
scribe it. Notice that his "new possibility for the world" theme is 
thoroughly dualistic, completely universal in scope, and, at least in 
the latter part of Theology of Hope ("Exodus Church"), framed in an 
23 Moltma.nn, p. 17,. 
ethics of martyrdom. There are differences between Moltmann's work 
and Jewish Apocalyptic. ~bltma.nn does not deal in cryptograms or prac-
tice pseud9nymity. Nor is tfoltmann disengaged from positivistic 
"demythologization." Perhaps the ultimate question for Moltmann's 
disciples will not be their relationship to curr.ent secular philosophies, 
but what they are to do with myth. This is a conjecture, however. The 
important point to note is that Msltmann not only tells us, but shows us 
how, by his own example, the modern church theologian can develop an 
eschatology of history more adequate to his horizon of expectation than 
that presented to him by the previous horizon's school, and that he 
shows us this by an additional, more biblical example, of the Apoca-
lypticists developing a new form of theology to present a horizon of 
expectation which the classical prophets could not see. 
F.aster eschatology 
In the Bible there remains one more eschatological tradition, that 
of the New Testament. This follows and builds upon the Apocalyptic 
tradition. The relationship between the r..:aster and Apocalyptic escha-
tologies is different from that between Prophetic and Apocalyptic in 
that, whereas it took a long time for the Hebrews to move from the 
Prophetic to the Apocalyptic, it took only one sudden event for the 
Church to move from Apocalyptic to New Testament eschatology. 1bat event 
was the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus. As a result there is 
far more interplay between Apocalyptic and Easter eschatology than 
there is between Prophetic and Apocalyptic. 
'!'he very idea of resurrection is a main theme of Apocalyptic 
eschatology. It is the expected event that ushers in the !Jew Age, or 
the kingdom of the Righteous. Russell interprets Is. 26:1, and Dan. 
12:2-3, both of which are resurrection passages., lJ.S explanations of 
the kingdom which is the lot of the righteous. He :-,ssumes that the 
risen bodies a re identical to the former physical uodies, and that an 
everlasting kingdom is to be established upon the earth.21.i. Hussell's is 
by no means the only view. In the Pseudepigrapha many other interpre-
tations of the resurrection are offered. Some include only the righteous, 
others .all ~en. Some involve the physical body, others variously 
describe "spiritual bodies. 1125 But in all the biblical and Pseudepig-
raphic accounts there is an ultimacy, an eschatological finality, a 
sense of the end that ac·companies the resurrection. 
This does not mean that there is no cormection between the earlier 
eschatology of the classical prophets and the resurrection of Jesus. 
Indeed, there seems to be a progression from the earthy, rough visions 
of Ezekiel 37 and Deutero-Isaiah, carried through the romantic notions 
of the end-time one finds in Zechariah, on into the bizarre pictures of 
the Apocalypticist, then finally emerging in the New Testament with the 
good news that the resurrection has happened in the case of Jesus. 
Zimmerli sees the resurrection of Jesus as a "renmant-event of 
Israel. 1126 For Zi1IDDerli the election-history of Israel has been concen-
trated in the personal life of Jesus. In the person of Jesus, Israel 
24Russell, p. 376. 
25Ibid. 
-
26zimmerli, p. 113. 
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undergoes its deepest hwniliation and at the same time the strongest 
confirmation of its election.27 As the Prophets had said, the old cove-
nant must come to an end; a new covenant is to take its place. As the 
Prophets had used language of the Exodus to describe Israel's new 
relationship to God, so the Apostles used language of the Prophets to 
describe the crucifixion-resurrection event. Jesus is called the Christ 
( Davidic tradition), and the Kyrios, which may mean "Yahweh" but may also 
mean the godly conterpart of Caesar. This last became the most impor-
tant title because of its universality. Zimmerli, with Oscar Cullman 
and several others, does not stop with the reduction of the body of the 
elect to a single person, but goes beyond this to the new Israel which 
Jesus has chosen, the "Israel of God" which is different from "Israel 
after the flesh." Zimmerli says, 11 Now, however, the covenant is es-
tablished in a freedom which involves the extending of an invitation to 
those who stand without. 1128 And, indeed, why not? If Jesus, and Jesus 
alone, was the Sha'are Zedek, then Jesus, and Jesus alone has the real 
authority to invite, to judge Israel and to determine who belongs to it 
and who does not. 
Moltmann, by contrast, does not develop the "True Israel" or the 
"Remnant" themes. He concentrates on the promise and fulfillment scheme 
described above in Chapter III. He does so against the background of 
positivism, taking great care to prevent the confusion of nature with 
27Ibid. 
28Ibid. 
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history. He is greatly concerned with the threat of death as a thwart 
to the fulfillment of the promise, and sees the resurrection tradition 
as a solution to this problem. 
Thus in Israel the idea of "raising of the dead" is formulated 
in the first instance within the framework of the religion of 
promise: it is not a case of natural tsic) reanimation, but of 
fulfilling of Yahweh's promises of life in the dead bearer of 
the promise. 2' 
Moltmann's "bearer of the promise" is very close to Zi1M1erli 1 s true 
renmant of Israel. 11 
It is not until the Apocalyptic writers that the "raising of 
the dead" is understood in universal terms, in the sense that 
even beyond death this God will achiev~ his judgment and his 
due in both righteous and unrighteous.JO 
Nothing must stand between the promise and the fulfillment. Even when 
death tries to interfere it is overcome. In fact, Moltmann's claim is 
The late Israelite ideas of creatio ex nihilo and resurrectio 
mortuorum mark the eschatological extremities of the religion 
of promise.31 
In the New Testament one has the additional announcement that the 
resurrection did indeed happen to Jesus of Nazareth. This, for Moltmann, 
"must be understood as the eschatological coming to pass of the faith-
fulness of God, and at the same time as the eschatological authentication 
of his promise and the dawning of its fulfillment • 1132 That is how Molt-
mann uses the history of traditions. He has taken the exegetical data 
from von Rad, Zimmerli, and others and framed the conclusions in the 
language of systematic theology. 
2
'Moltmann, pp. 20,-210. 
JQibid. 
31rbid. 
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Formulation of an eschatological understanding of history 
In order to make his systematic theological sta tements, Moltmann 
appli es the content of the traditions dialectically t o the questions of 
contemporary philosophy. According to t-bltmann himself he stands vis-a-
vis the philosophers with an eschatological-theological, and therefore 
non-philosophical answer. According to Braaten, Moltmann's answer is 
dependent on the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. I n a sens e they a re both 
r i ght, for Bloch's philosophy has an eschatologica l element, while 
Moltmann's theology goes beyond Bloch to apply biblical traditions. 
Humanism, hope, and wish-fulfillment 
Philosophy's side of the "dialogue" presents the questions with 
which contempora ry man is wrestling. One large constellation of these 
questions surrounds the central one: "What does it mean to be human?" 
Samuel Keen analyzes this as follows: 
Modern man is rejecting the traditional notion that human life 
has only limited creative potentialities becaus e the world into 
which man emerges already has meaning and value. Therefore life 
is viewed not as a gi~ but as a burden, and the world as a 
neutral arena of blind physical laws. Man must assume respon-
sibility for creating mj'.f1ing. r·ian has claimed the divine 
attributes for himself. 
Theology is hard pressed to explain what it means to be human because 
the ques tion is so bound up with static ideas about "nature." Moltrnann, 
and many other theologians, would like to be able to stand up and bear 
33sam Keen, "Hope in a Posthuman J.:.:ra, 11 New Theology, edited by 
.Martin Marty and C-ean Peerman (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 %8), 
v, 81. 
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their side of the dialogue, but the nature of the uiblical material, 
especially the promises, forbids any static view of humanity in the 
world. The promises are eschatological, and Moltmann insists that the 
contemporary theologian's side of the dialogue must also be eschatological. 
Right now humanity is incomplete. TheoloeY will be able to give a 
better answer if the question were, "What will humanity be?" The an-
swer to that ·question puts us into the rea lm of hope. 
C~ring ~he age of Positivism the very idea of hope aroused 
suspicion because of the Freudian doctrine of wish-fulfillment. Keen 
has been careful to distinguish between hope and wish-fulfillment, as 
one can see in this passage from the essay cited above: 
The optimist conspires to ignore the facts because they suggest 
an interpretation he does not want to make. Contrariwise, the 
believer's affirmation of a ground of hope is made in the know-
ledge that by all realistic calculations human history is utterly 
tragic. It is in the light of this certain knowledge· that the 
believer sets himself to examine his experience to detennine 
whether there is any basis for
3
toping that what is penultimately 
the case is not untimately so. 
Moltmann goes a step beyond this. He says that the Positivist has 
ignored valid evidence, namely, the historical fact of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. Thus there is evidence against the ultimacy of 
"utterly tragic" human history . The ground of hope is the "future of 
Jesus Christ. 1135 
.34Ibid., V, 87. 
35Moltmann, p . 17 . 
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Christian eschatology speaks of Jesus Christ and his future. 
It recognizes the reality of the raising ef Jesus and pro-
claims the future of the risen Lord. Hence the question 
whether all statements about the future are grounded in the 
person and history of Jesus Christ provides it with the 
touchstone by which t~ distinguish the spirit of eschatology 
from that of utopia.3 
So Moltmann has made, as his theological contribution to the dialogue, 
the liberating distinction between hope and wish-fulfilment. It is a 
liberating distinction because, in contrast to Bultmann who seeks a 
place for t heology a round the periphery of philosophy, Moltmann has 
made an apologetic penetration of philosophy's very citadel. Thanks to 
Moltmann's boldness, theologians who build on his ideas can walk boldly 
into the academy with a respect that was not afforded them there a 
generation ago. 
Moltmann's use of Ernst Bloch's philosophy 
Part of the dialogue process between philosophy and theology 
centers around what was described in Chapter II of this paper, in the 
citation from Carl Braaten; namely, the "cultural point of contact." 
Braaten made the point that Bloch's philosophy was the "non-theological 
point of contact" for Moltmann's theology of hope.37 Curiously, through-
out his works, Braaten never ci tes anything from I.:as Prinzip Hoffnung 
which he claims is fundamental to Moltmann I s theology. Indeed, The-
ology of Hope cites Bloch's magnum opus only three times, and the long-
es t quote is a single sentence. So rather than looking f or materi al 
36,Ibid. 
37supra, Chap. II, p. 27, also fn. 44. 
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which is carried over from Bloch to Moltmann, the procedure here will 
be to describe Bloch's hope and see how Moltmann's hope is a theolog-
ical development of it. 
One will find many references to Bloch as a II Marxist, 11 or a 
"Hegelian" philosopher, and these have some value. But Bloch's works 
reflect something beyond Marx and Hegel. Bloch is a humanist, not in 
the classical sense, as for instance Erasmus or Lorenzo Valla were, 
but in a strictly modern, post-positivistic sense. Consider the 
following: 
The full genesis, the genesis of human adequacy, is found 
only in the prophets of the Old and New Testaments; they 
alone distinguish the new aeon from the old by the cessa-
tion of bondage ••• Incipit vita~ is the Dantesque 
fonnula that inauguarated the new age. Its roots are in 
modern economics; but no one can deny that the current 
which fed the ideological gro~th of its roots, and which 
made and makes even the name 'new .age' possible, rose 
from the unsatisf~ed pathos of a new aeon still animated 
by Christianity.3 
The above passage describes a hopeful humanism that is in some 
ways similar to the hope of the Apocalypticist. Neither the Apoca-
lyptic writers nor Bloch take human nature as a given, the former be-
cause of their theocentric view of the universe, the latter, however, 
from a humanistic and "atheistic" standpoint. Bloch's system centers 
around the simple proverb 11 S is not yet P. 11 In his essay "lncipit Vita 
Nova" Bloch explains what he means by 11 S is not yet P, 11 namely, that 
there is no subject for which the ultimate predicate may be asserted. 
JSErnst Bloch, "Incipit vita nova," translated by E. !3 • .\shton, 
Man on His Own (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 1,-80. 
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This must be distinguished from Heraclitus view which might be sunmari.zed 
as 11S never has been, is not no\'. , and never wil l be P. 11 Bloch is not a 
dynamic Positivist, but a philosopher of hope. The e,round for hope lies 
in the material universe and in the societies that develop among men whor 
live in it. In that very "arena" no subject has its adequate predicate 
already.YI Bloch says, "In this impulse and course hope is moving; with 
close-range objectives in mind when the long-range end is considered, 
and (wi th regard to the thing that really matters) with long-range ends 
in mind when the close-range objectives are in view. 114° Here we have a 
secular use of the "horizon of expectation" concept with which iv,oltmann 
and Pannenberg have been working in their theologies. 
There is some evidence in 'lheolog_y of Hope that Braaten is right 
in his assertion that Bloch's philosophy is a "non-theological point 
of contact" for Moltmann's theology. Consider the following: 
The horizon of expectation within which a Christian doctrine 
of conduct must be developed is the eschatological horizon 
of expectation of the kingdom of God, of his righteousness 
and his peace with a new creation, of his freedom and his 
humanity for all men. This horizon alone, with its formative 
effect on the present, leads a man in missionary hope to op-
pose and suffer under the inadequacies of the present, brings 
him into conflict with the present form of society, and causes 
him to discover the "cross of the present" (Hegel).41 
This is no isolated paragraph. It is a central part of l'k>ltmann's 
conclusion. He has been building up to this through all of his 
exegesis, all of his analysis of the present situation, all of his po-
lemic against Positivism. ~bltmann has described the final adequate 
3
'Ibid., p. 90 
40Ibid. 
41Moltmann, p. 334. 
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predication of humanity as the work of the promise-fulfilling God, and 
the age in which people will enjoy the blessings of "the genesis of 
human adequacy" as the "kingdom of God." 
"Now, any modern writer" must be careful to note how he uses the 
term "humanism." There was a philosophical movement in Germany in the 
early nineteenth century called Humanismus which was a romantic, ideal-
istic and thoroughly optimistic philosophy. This type of humanism 
might be called panthistic. Its roots lay in Renaissance humanism; its 
watchword was, "The proper study of mankind is man. 1142 Part of the 
problem is that the English word "humanism" has another usage, which 
constantly infiltrates the usage given above. This latter usage ha s to 
do with the study of the humanities, particularly of classical languages 
and philosophies, often by people who accept the classical Greek and 
Iatin values and make them their own. A somewhat static view of the 
world is usually part of that value system. In the Renaissance, the 
popular humanistic Weltanschauung was directly connected with the in-
terest in antiquity, particularly in the Classics. While nineteenth-
century humanism had a more sophisticated, (and, amazingly, at the same 
time more romantic) form of pantheism than its fifteenth-century counter-
part, even this "humanism" falls short of describing the philosophy of 
Ernst Bloch. Bloch calls himself an "atheist" rather than a pantheist. 
Yet Bloch does not write like an atheist, for example, Camus. For want 
of a better term, Bloch might be described as an "anthropotheist. 11 
Bloch, for all practical purposes, accepts the Bible as the Word of God; 
42webster's New International Dictionary (2nd edition), p. 1212, 
one finds this interesting definition of "Humanism": "a contemporary 
cult or belief calling itself religious but substituting faith in man 
for faith in God. 11 
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not the Word of Jesus, Yahweh, the Trinity, and others, but the Word of 
the man of the future, who is the real "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." 
If we dare to call Bloch a "hwnanist," then, it must be with this anthro-
potheism in mind. 
This does not mean that Moltmann is an anthropotheist. He is a 
Christian theologian. But Braaten may well be correct in his assertion 
that Bloch's philosophy is a "non-theological point of contact" for 
t-bltmann's theology. 
There are differences between Bloch and Holtmann, however. One 
clear difference is in their exegesis of the Bible. For Holtmann, the 
center of the Scripture is the resurrection of Jesus. As was pointed 
out earlier in this chapter, the resurrection, for Moltmann, "must be 
understood as the eschatological coming to pass of the faithfulness of 
God. 1143 Moltmann refuses to call the intermediate fulfilments of the 
divine promises 11rnyths. 11 He does attempt to demythologize the future 
promises (such as "meeting the Lord in the air") in favor of a ter-
restrial millenium, but the acts of God's event-creating word of pro-
mise in the past are taken seriously as the driving forces of history. 
Bloch, on the other hand, finds the center of Scripture in Genesis 3, 
the "subversive promise" of the snake.44 Bloch calls the content of the 
temptation 11the good news of Christian salvation." 
This eritis is clearly the most subversive word in all myths 
open to an anthropocentric interpretation--from the serpent 
up to Prometheus, and to the resolution of all longings and 
43supra, p. ,1, fn. J2. 
44Ernst Bloch, "Religious Truth," translated by ,John Cumming, Man 
2!! His Own, p. 114. 
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thoughts ~der God in the "third Gospel" of the Christlike 
community. 5 
Moltmann will have none of this. He does not even enter into dialogue 
with Bloch on this point. The only place where Moltmann came close to 
discussing this matter, and discussing in a very interesting mixture of 
explication and implication, is in his conclusion to the section called 
"Revelation and the Knowledge of God." Here Moltmann sununons up the 
specter of Genesis by his reference to God's verdict that all things 
were very good," but he applies it to the eschaton, to a utopian eschaton. 
He also uses a pun here, that God stands against (entgegensteht) man 
until man creates and understands a true fulfilment reality, therefore 
the God who promises is an object (Gegenstand).46 There is a philoso-
phical similarity here to Bloch's 11 S is not yet P, 11 but not an identity. 
For Moltma.nn, eschatology does not begin until the historical partic-
ularity of Israel appears on the scene, with the patriarchs and their 
words of promise. 1-"·lhatever may be said 0f the antedeluvian events and 
c~n~ersations belongs to aetiology and the epiphany cults. 
Moltmann 1 s limited Blochism might be summarized by saying that the 
rejects anthropotheism for the present even in the form of expectation. 
He does so because of his intense devotion to the resurrected Lord. 
Even so he is willing to project Bloch's ideas about the man of the fu-
ture into his own Apocalyptic interpretation of the kingdom of God and 
_45rbid. 
4,Moltmann, p. 120. 
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of the possibilities for good and evil in history which lie in the 
field of hope and can be acquired only there.47 
Eschatology of history in Moltmann and Pannenberg 
The most remarkable item in l;,!olfhart Pannen·oerg' s apprach to history 
is that the future is metaphysically paramount. The future is more "real" 
than the present, which in turn is more "real" than the past. Pannenberg 
is willing to claim that Jesus gave similar priority to the future. 
Once this is admitted, Pannenberg is able to give hope-centered inter-
pretations to dominical logia concerning the kingdom at great variance 
with both the traditional and the existential interpretations. Thus, 
according to Pannenberg, Jesus did not see the Kingdom of God as be-
ginning with His personal presence to be fulfilled in the future, but 
as beginning in the future and being realized, or fulfilled, in His 
personal presence.48 Pannenberg says, 11In this way we see the present as 
an effect of the future, in contrast to the conventional assumption 
that past and present are a cause of the future. 114CJ 
Jesus proclaimed the rule of God as a reality belonging to the 
future. This is the coming Kingdom. 'l'he idea .....,,~ s not new, 
being a conventional aspect of Jewish expectation. ',I/hat was 
new was Jesus' understanding that God I s claim on the ··•orld is 
to be viewed exclusively in terms of his coming rule • . Thus it 
47Ibid., p. 2e3. 
48\oiolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: 
~Jestminster Press, l'J69), p. 54. 
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is necessary to say, in a restricted but important sense, that 
God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are in-
separable, God's being is still in the process of coming to be.5@ 
For Pannenberg the priority of the future is universal. If we currently 
beg the question whether God's being and rule are inseparable, which will 
be taken up in Chapter VI, and admit this presupposition so that we may 
better understand the relationship between Pannenberg and Moltmann, then 
the experience of history becomes a realizing process of a prior exis-
ting future which is already determined and complete, as complete and 
perfect as the essence of the deity. This future breaks in upon the 
present and realizes itself in part. At the end of history the reali-
zation process will be finished. The com=i:ng to pass of the rule of God, 
the form of which is predetermined and was revealed through the teach-
ings of Jesus, will be complete. 
Moltmann's critique of Pannenberg's 11eschatological11 world view is 
part of his more "general critique of the epiphany religions, namely, 11 
This situation is ironical because Pannenberg sets out with 
the proposition that "history is what happens between promise 
and fulfillment." But he abandons the word of promise in favor 
of events of promise and fulfillment as the bearers of revela-
tion, therefore he retains the Greek cosmic theology in prin-
ciple, though making it eschatological from the standpoint of 
present epistemology.51 
In other words, Holtmann rejects any and all attempts to objectify the 
God of the promise, (except in the sense of the German pun cited above). 
If he is unwilling to accept a theology based upon the manifestation of 
5®~., p. 56. 
51Moltmann, pp. 78-79. 
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the "eternal present," then he cannot be willing to accept a theology 
based upon a progressive realization of the eternal future. 
'I'he consequences of Pannenberg's position for hermeneutics here 
criticized by Holtmann would be to view Jesus as a future-existing 
prophet who made an appearance in time. His death was an historical 
event. His resurrection was an event of the future, connected with 
uesus' death in time only through His person. These events gave authen-
ticity to Jesus' message of the kingdom, a message which differed from 
the Jewish eschatological hope only in that 11Jesus underscored the pres-
ent impact of the imminent future. 11 52 This view upholds the finality of 
God's self-revelation through Jesus of Nazareth testified to in the 
Bible, but it does so at the expense of the word of promise. According 
to Pannenberg's view God does not make promises through Jesus, He an-
nounces future facts. The rest of the Old and New Testament message 
has ever-diminishing significance as the possibility of the hearer's 
reacting to the historical Jesus becomes more and more a possibility of 
reacting to an account rather than a person. The idea of future facts 
is not without merit. Moltmann agrees that God promises a specific fu-
ture to man, just as He promised a specific future to the patriarchs. 
But according to Moltrnann, God's promise sets active hope in motion to 
claim the fulfillment. For Pannenberg the promise merely announces the 
inevitable and presents an ethical decision to be made in the light of 
the inevitable. 
Moltmann wants to keep Pannenl,erg's certainty about a specific 
future, based on a promise that "binds man to the future and gives him 
52Pannenberg, p. 53. 
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a sense for history. 11 53 He also wants to keep the progressive view of 
promise as a "horizon of expectation, 11 directed into the future and 
moving along with universal history which "invites us to press futher 
ahead. 11 54 And most of all, ti.ioltmann agrees with Pannenberg, and thereby 
disagrees with Positivism, that because the present is an effect of the 
future, "reality as a whole" is therefore "historically open and pro-
visional in view of that end of history in which the wholeness of 
reality will come to light. n55 
Moltmann's Theology of Hope as an answer to Barr's concerns 
The last section of this chapter will be devoted to the whole 
problem of "revelation through history" as it was presented by James 
Barr in his inaugural address at Princeton Theological ~eminary, and as 
it was reprinted by i'larty and Peerman in New 'l'heolog.y. The following 
is a relevant portion of Barr's address: 
'l'o say this does not mean that we are trying to get rid of the 
idea of revelation through history. This idea is, I believe, a 
fair expression of a really important element in the Bible; 
there really is a Heilsgeschichte, a series of events set within 
the plane of human life and in historical sequence, through 
which God has revealed himself. I would not doubt that we have 
been generally right in saying that this can be taken as the 
central theme of the Bible, that it forms the main link between 
Old and New Testaments, and that its presence and importance 
clearly marks Biblical faith off from other religions. I do 
feel, however, that there are other axes through the Biblical 
material which are equally pervasive and important, although 
they may not be so comforting apologeti cally. 
53Moltmann, p. 103. 
54Ibid., p. 125. 
55rbict., pp. 276-277. 
And I also feel that our apologetic situation in relation to 
the world outside of theology is changing, so that the value 
of an orientation to history may alter.56 
Moltmann agrees and suggests an answer. His "other axis" through the 
Bible is eschatology. The response to eschatology is hope. And the 
link between the eschatological asix through the Bible and the salvation-
historical "biblical faith" is the horizon of expectation concept. 
If Barr was correct in saying that revelation through history was a 
response to the apologetic needs of the Nineteenth Century57 when 
"history" seemed to threaten Christianity , then the modern interpreter 
has to start looking for that other axis through the Bible which best 
suits Twentieth Century apologetics. For Holtmann, his understanding of 
the theology of hope constitutes such an axis. Moltmann applies the 
apologetics of hope as follows: 
To think God and history together on the ground of the event of 
the promise in the resurrection of Christ does not mean to prove 
God from the world or from history, but vice-versa to show the 
world to be history that is open to God and to the future. 
Christian theology will thus not be able to come to tenns with, 
but will have to free itself from, the cosmologico-mechanistic 
way of thinking such as is found in the positivistic sciences -
whether in the scientific disenchanting of the world, by which 
the world not only becomes 11godless, 11 as Max Weber has said, 
but also becomes without alternatives, without possibilities and 
without any future, as in the factualized and institutionalized 
relationships of the scientific civilization of modern society, 
which in the same way is threatened with the loss not only of 
its future but of its own historic character as well. Theology 
will be able to free itself, ho~ever, only by breaking up this 
56page 6,. 
57Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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kind of thinking and these relationships and striving tb set 
them in the eschatological movement of history.58 
1''or Moltmann, therefore, eschatology is the measure of all things. 
It is the only valid interpretation that turns events (Geschehen) into 
Geschichte. Another reviewer of Moltmann's work, Herbert Dymale, comes 
to the same conclusion: 
If hope was the key to what motivated Old Testament people, 
then it should be the key to our motivation. Theology based 
on hope is free from all kinds of world views and utopian 
schemes, for now world history .can be experienced in the 
light of the future of truth.,, 
The key to hermeneutics, then, is not so much the r evelation of truth 
through historical events, but it is the opening up of history through 
eschatology. In the words of r'1oltmann hi mself: 
It is neither that history s,·1allows up eschatology (Albert 
Schweitzer) nor does eschatology swallow up history (Rudolf 
Bultmann). The logos of the eschat'6n is promise of that 
which is not yet, and for that reason it makes history. 
The promise which announces the eschaton, and in the eschaton 
announces itself, is the motive power, th&,mainspring, the 
driving force and the torture of history. · · 
So we have seen how Moltmann works with the exegetical data 
derived from the Bible according to the methods described in Chap~er 
III. The chief datum is eschatology; that is, the presentation of a 
promise and an invitation to hope. 'lhe occurrence of fulfilment events 
expands the horizon of the promise, alters reality (Wirklichkeit) 
[which can also mean the dialectical "synthesis"] , and focuses at-
tention on the antithetical "overspill" t hat challenges even the new 
58Moltmann, p. ~3. 
5,Herbert Dymale, "What Kind of Hope is Adequate? " Christianity 
Today, XV (June 18, 1,71), 9-10 (877-878). 
60 6 Moltmann, p. 1 5. 
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reality. The final operation of systematic theology is to apply the 
biblical message to contemporary questions in terms of "dialogue" with 
the philosophy of the age. 
Moltmann's polemics against positivism are very effective. He 
describes it as a phenomenon of the past--the ultimate place of re-
probation. His apologetics are in terms of irnst Bloch's revisionist 
Marxism, a system that takes the idea of eschatology seriously. As a 
result, Moltmann's gospel is primarily a humanistic gospel {:certainly 
not Moltmann's term, but definitely Bloch 1i}, presented in more or 
less traditional language. Yet if our only knowledge of Moltmann de-
pended on Theology of Hope, we could hardly conclude that he is nothing 
more than a revisionist Marxist like Bloch. The language in this book 
is too ambiguous . As we shall see, some of his shorter articles re-
move any doubt. 
CHAPTER V 
HERM.EN'.1WTICAL PRINCIPLES IN 
i'10LTMANN 1S LESSER WORKS 
This chapter, unlike the main section of this study, does not 
examine Theology of Hope, but seeks instead to find important state-
ments from Jurgen Moltmann in some of his articles. As in the main 
section, however, the chief concern is with hermeneutics. In particular 
it deals with the use Moltmann makes of history. Some of the questions 
raised in Chapters III an IV appear again: whether Moltmann uses the 
principle of analogy as historians do, whether history is as important 
to Moltmann as he claims or whether it is really swallowed up by escha-
tology, whether Moltmann uses words the same way consistently. 
In Chapter IV above it was noted that Moltmann was much more sure 
of what he meant by "eschatology" than the Old Testament professors 
Gerhard von Rad and Walther Zimmerli. In an essay entitled 11 'l'he Future 
as Threat and Opportunity111 one finds a precise definition of "eschatology" 
in Holtmann I s own words: "a belief that takes the initiative towa rd trans-
forming the world by means of the possibilities of the present. 112 This is 
entirely consistent with the conclusion reached at the end of section 
1 .• Jurgen Moltmann, "The Future as Threat and as Opportunity, 11 
translated by Shierry Weber, The Reli~ious Situation, edited by Donald 
R. Cutler (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969 p. ~25. 
2 Ibid. 
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2 in Chapter IV above; namely, that 1-bltmann saw himself as the contemporary 
counterpart to the Apocalypticist whose theological traditions were in-
adequate to minister to his hope because the horizon of expectation had 
moved on. Hope must have promises to survive, and t~ltmann has found in 
the Scriptures the promise of a transformed world, a promise that has 
been neglected by the prevailing voices in theology. One might ask whether 
Moltmann is qualifying his hope for the future unnecessarily by stating 
that the transformation is to be accomplished 11by means of the possibilities 
of the present." Moltmann makes it very clear that he is not merely 
practicing trend analysis. He is not extrapolating the future from the 
present, but anticipating it. As for the initiative toward the transforma-
tion, Moltmann claims that Christian faith "mediates in practice" between 
the anticipated future and the possibilities of the present.3 
t-k>ltmann goes so far as to equate 11 faith 11 and 11 hope. 11 That is 
because the object of faith is the 11God in front of us, 11 and the object 
of hope is "his kingdom" made recognizable in the world. There is no 
God without the kingdom and no kingdom without God.4 This transformation 
of the world is a divine act in the same way that the exodus of Israel 
and the resurrection of Jesus were divine acts.5 Whereas in Theology of 
Hope .Moltmann's ethics called for a contradiction of the donditions of 
the present, in "The Future as Threat and Opportunity" they go beyond 
)Ibid., p. n6. 
4Ibid., pp. ,24-~25. 
5Ibid. 
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any passive, negative, patient waiting to an active initiative involved 
in transforming. This activity is probably also Moltmann's intention 
in Theology of Hope but it is never .as clearly stated there as it is 
in the short article. 
If the concepts of "faith" and "hope" have been equated in "The 
Future as Threat and Opportunity" they are distinguished in "The Realism 
of Hope. 116 Faith, according to r-foltmann, is abundantly present in the 
church of today, whereas hope, coupled with hunger for freedom, is lack-
ing.? Faith here signifies the ability to comprehend and to interpret 
the Gospel message. There is no want of biblical interpreters in our 
church, but hope demands that the church go beyond interpretation. 
It involves the church with the "God in front of us," and makes the 
church restless for the kingdom. In this article, and in Theology of 
Hope, Moltmann uses the word "faith" to denote the quiet, passive side 
of the Christian life. It is almost an intellectual when the context is a 
discussion of Rudolf Bultmann's theology. "Hope" on the other hand, is 
the dynamic, active dimension of the Christian life, the outward-looking, 
world-confronting, future-grasping dimension. Consider this statement: 
Yet faith also underwent a change as this hope that the 
future was coming ••• was lost in the quicksands of 
history ••• 8 • All that Faster meant was: there is a life after death. 
8Full title: "The Realism of Hope: The Feast of the Resurrection 
and the Transformation of the Present Reality," translated by Gilbert 
A. Thiele, Concordia Theological Monthly XL (March 1969), 14,-155. 
7 . Ibid., XL, 14,. 
8Ibid., XL, 1 50. 
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In l'bltmann's judgment, the church relinquished its social eschatology 
for an individual eschatology. The concern for the world was there all 
along, but the optimism, according to Moltmann, disappeared. It would 
have been appreciated a great amount of supportive evidence, especially 
from the medieval period, for i'loltmann's statement. One seeks it in 
vain. But the intention here is not to evaluate Moltmann's historical 
judgment. The significance for Moltmann's hermeneut:!,.cs is this: social 
eschatology is the key cater,ory, the main axis through the Scriptures, 
around which all of the Biblical teachings are mustered and classified. 
One ought to expect, therefore, a polemical attitude toward the church 
which, according to Moltmann, has substituted an individualized for 
the original social eschatology. 
In fact, Moltmann goes beyond polemics to a specific program as 
outlined in "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel. n'J 
One must be able to apply the biblical horizon of concern 
between the Chris~ event and the coming of the kingdom to 
the corresponding present horizon of concern between free-
dom and oppression. 
From this vantage point, then, textual exegesis is no longer 
only .a peculiar concern for self-understanding which will 
occasionally conform with comprehension. It is more a mat-
ter of special understanding of the text's concern which 
strives for practical congruence between the biblical trad-
ition's horizon of concern and present circumstances. It 
also perceives the needs and the opportunities of present 
social reality. 10 
'J~rgen Moltmann, "Toward a Politi.cal Hermeneutic of the Gospel," 
Union ~eminary Quarterly Review, XXIII , no. 4 (1968), 303-323. 
1 Olbid., XXIII, 314. 
.. 
The content of the specific program is "political henneneutics, 11 
the application of the biblical message to "present social reality" 
in terms of the political "opportunities." The pattern for political 
hope is "the biblical tradition's horizon of concern," which it is the 
function of the modern interpreter to divest of mythology and other 
hinderances to immediate social applicability. The church then, is to 
make political decisions which it believes will bring political reality 
closer to "practical congruence" with the pattern for political hope. 
In Chapter IV above, the point was made that Theology of !lope left 
the role of myth in hermeneutics unclear. In "Toward a Political Hermen-
eutic of the Gospel" Holtmann does not wait for his disciples to answer 
the question, but affirms that history is the absolute setting for all 
hope, and that political action is the only sacrament. ~very transcen-
dental element has been removed except "the future," which someday will 
be immanent but for the present is, at least conceptually, transcendent. 
The ground for demythologization is not one's world-view, but the cross 
of Jesus Christ. 11 Now Holtmann does not demythologize the crucifixion. 
But this historical fact of the cross of Jesus Christ is applied by the 
Biblical interpreter as the "expression of real human affliction, 1112 
the problem, or "need" of present social reality corresponds to it. The 
resurrection is "the protest" against affliction.13 It also has a con-
11 Ibid., XXIII, 313. 
12Ibid., XXIII, 314. 
13rbid. 
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temporary counterpart, namely, the church's political activity in striv-
ing for social change. So M:>ltmann can say, 
Consequently, the missionary proclamation of the cross of the 
Resurrected One is not an opium of the people which intoxicates 
and incapacitates, but the ferment of new freedom. 14 
This "ferment" is an "effort to realize" the content of social 
eschatology. It is an optimistic ferment, because it believes that 
one day history will be the kingdom of God. 
Moltmann's specific program is also a Marxist program. There is 
no doubt about this. Christian hope cannot be content with a social-
eschatological interpretation (Bonhoeffer) nor a rationalistic enlight-
enment (Feuerbach), but must strive for a historical realization of the 
Christian religion as outlined by Marx. 15 
What light do Moltmann's short writings shed upon his Theology of 
Hope? Aside from giving us many more examples of his use of the cate-
gory of history and the principle of analogy, they give us a clear defi-
nition of eschatology as Moltmann understands it. They help us to un-
derstand his use of the terms II faith II and 11hope, 11 and they spell out, 
in a way Theology of Hope does not, Moltmann's completely immanent, 
historical setting for the biblical message and for the kingdom of God. 
l4Ibid. 
l5Ibid., XXIII, 312. 
CHAPTER VI 
CRITIQUE OF THEOLOOY OF HOPE 
Moltmann and the Orthodox Christian Church 
,• 
This chapter is an attempt to evaluate Jurgen Holtmann's Theology 
of Hope, particularly his hermeneutics and the view of history that lies 
at the bottom of his hermeneutics. Moltmann's relationship to historical 
Christianity is discussed first because the prospective assumed by the 
author is dravm from his commitment to Christianity, particularly 
Christian orthodoxy. This includes the conviction that theology should 
be evaluated with regard to its claims of service to the church. 
Moltmann does not claim to be orthodox. But as part of the pre-
lude to his labor, he is constantly calling the reader's attention to 
the history of the church and all of it conflicts. Moltmann definitely 
conceives of his theology as a contribution to the main stream of 
ecclesiastical thought. The following attempt to contrast the ortho-
dox Christian faith with Moltmann's theology of hope is arranged around 
three focal questions: the concept of revelation through history, the 
path of theological knowledge, and the hermeneutical center of the 
Scriptures. 
Revelation through history: universal or particular? 
The most frequent context in which the theme of revelation through 
history is discussed today is the nee-orthodox contention that revelation 
is an individual, subjective matter, quite independent of verifiable 
data, and the counter-claim that revelation takes place through God's 
activity in universal history, in verifiable events. This context is, 
regrettably, independent of the discussion referred to in Chapter II 
above, namely the work of R.R. Niebuhr1regarding historical knowledge 
as such. In Theology of Hope Holtmann contends against the neo-ortho-
dox view. As was demonstrated above, he refuses to accept the subject-
object complex which cut theology off from investigation. But when 
Holtmann made his decision to stand on history, since he lacked any 
modern scientific investigation of the historical events upon which the 
Christian faith is grounded, he accepted the claim of Albert Schweitzer 
that the events are not verifiable. It is true that he did not accept 
this without a great deal of complaining, and, perhaps in agreement 
with James Barr, he has found another important 1!axis 11 through the 
Scriptures, namely, eschatology. Moltmann claims that while for 
Schweitzer history "swallows up eschatology," he gives eschatology its 
due by making it the driving force of history in the Hegelian sense. 
But such a claim is not verifiable (except from the!_ posteriori view-
point of one standing at the end of history). No scientific investi-
gation of history has to this date proved that eschatology is its 
driving force. 
Moreover, as Moltmanr. develops his Theology of Hope it becomes 
apparent that the "universa l history" he is talking about is limited 
lfiichard Ii. Niebuhr, Hesurrection and Historical h'.eason ( New 
York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1~57). 
to the ~·ies tern \-.•or ld, and furthermore to the Kantian era. His view of 
history is a Kantian view, much like ~khwei tzer' s. And the practical 
application of his theology is his "eschatological" ethics, his "exodus 
church," which is a whole community of Albert ~chweitzers, or a regi-
ment of people like francis of Assisi. 
The orthodox Christian faith, by contrast, does not speak of 
revelation in universal history, nor in subjectivity, but in the actual 
events of the history of a particular people, their prophetic and 
apostolic interpretation. The orthodox Christian begins with divine 
revelation and then addresses it to history. This attitude is des- · 
cribed by Eric Rust as follows: 
In the Heorew-Christian tradition the emphasis falls, not on 
human reason, but on divine revelation. This tradition points 
to a particular series of events unified around a supreme event, 
Jesus Christ, his life, death, and resurrection. It regards 
these events as the medium of divine self-disclosure. The 
basic promise is that the ultimate truth is not universally 
available, waiting everywhere to be discovered and unveiled by 
human reason, as the Greek tradition supposed, but that it is 
bound up with a particular history. God has been pleased 
to show himself redernptively, to manifest his true nature, in 
a special stream of historical events in which he has acted 
with power and great glory to deliver men.2 
It has been argued that there is no scientific verification for 
the theory that God has revealed Himself to man if the particular 
history of the Hebrews culminating in Jesus of Nazareth. Cne might 
reply that there is no evidence to the contrary. '!'his leads to the 
conclusion that theological knowledge has not yet become verifiable 
in a scientific way• Although it is commonly held that certain theo-
logical postulates (for e:xa 1 . . . 
mp e, llll.racles) have been disproved by the 
2Eric Rust. Towards a Theolo . . .. 
York: Oxford University p 1.cal l.Jnderstana1.n of His tor (New 
ress, 1963 , p. 61 • 
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discovery of repeated and predictible patte~s (interesLingly referred 
to as "laws") of nature, this common uelief is limited to an empirical 
methodology which cannot investigate the past, and can make historical 
judgments only by supposing that natural conditions have always been 
very similar. The orthodox Christian would not ae ree with that position 
without some evangelical qualification. 
The path of theological knowledge 
Moltmann was quoted above in Chapter III to the effect that 
theological knowledge always begins with the concrete, particular his-
torical data and moves toward the universal and eschatological. ::io he 
began by investi ga ting the concrete, particular history of Jesus of 
Nazareth, the Jewish setting, the influence of the Uld Testament on 
the thoughts of Jesus and the Apostles, the interpretation of the 
resurrection according to the promises in the Old Testament, the tra-
ditions of that Apocalyptic movement which began during the Antiochene 
persecution and persisted into the earliest church. ~ext he analyzes 
.. 
these data according to the discipline of liberlieferungsgeschichte, a 
very thoroughgoing process in which the content of the traditions is 
used as a curb to channel the thoughts one nught have about the resur-
rection as an event into directions consistent with the Apocalyptic 
interpretations of the relationship between God and the world. Molt-
mann observed how the Apocalypticist theologized by building on the 
prophetic tradition, then he turned his attention to the disciples and 
how they theologized, applying Apocalyptic traditions to the resur-
rection. finally, Moltmann did what he believed the Apocalyptic 
1.-:ri ters were doing mutatis mutandis; he t heologized by applying neo-
orthodox exegetical studies to his new "horizon" of hope. 
One promise that underlies r4oltmann' s Uberlieferungsgeschichte 
is that no one event completely satisfies a di vine promise. There is 
always an "overspill." In English translat i on the word "overspill" 
just hangs, unrelated to the concept of "tradition." In Gerrnan, 
however, roltmann is playing with the word, and this complica tes his 
theology rather than clarifying it. Moltmann is never ~uite clear 
about his ov.n concept of tradition. If Moltmann is talking Pannen-
.. 
bergian language, and Uberlieferungsgechichte means the ,iclassification 
of overspills," one divine promise always leading to another, (an in-
terpretation which is certainly possible on the basis of 'lheology of 
Hope), then only the final generation will know what God's promises 
and covenant are really all about. All t he rest of mankind is 
putting a puzzle together, handicapped by so many missing pieces, al-
though later generations had more of t he pieces than earlier gener-
.. 
ations. On the other hand, Uberlieferungsgeschichte might mean the 
study of 'fT",r'~ 6 ouc 1 , or what has been called "history of the trans-
mission of traditions." .1.f the latter is true, then revela tion is an 
event experienced by the ancient ones and preserved by subsequent 
generations, ~ith the original content getting more and more obscure 
with the passage of time, and complicated by the rise of new traditions. 
In Theolog.y of Hope, the former interpretation, "classification 
of overspills" seems to predominate. 
In orthodox Christian theology on the other hand, "tradition" 
/ 
always means 11';{JJ..J Ol<I. God may have given out limited fragments 
of revelation in the Old Testament, (Hebr. 1 :1), out in the New He has 
revealed His kingdom, His plans for the future, and His will for His 
people by "speaking to us through a Son," who is "the image of the 
invisible God, the firstborn of creation," who "was put to death for 
our offenses and raised again for our justification." The apostolic 
generation was the final generation in which revelation occurs. 'I'heolo-
gizing takes on a new character after the passing of the apostolic age: 
no longer is the bearer of the word concerned so much with interpreting, 
finding meaning for himself, as he is with witnessing, sharing absolute 
meaning with others. The form of the witness evolves from one generation 
to the next because the secular history and consequently the "vernacular" 
language is never stable. but the content is still the apostolic 
faith, the "faith once delivered unto the saints." There is a quali-
tative difference between synthesizing a theology from incomplete, 
elementary revelations, and finding new ways of confessing the one 
holy faith. This is the contrast between Theology of Hope, insofar as 
it is Pannenbergian, and the orthodox Christian theology. 
The hermeneutical center of Scripture 
Ever since the close of the apostolic age the church has been 
engaged in theological conflicts in which both parties have appealed 
to the authority of the lJible. Very early in the church's hisc.ory 
the canon of :,jcripture was established. This narrowed the scope of 
,4 
the conflict to some extent but did not diminish the intensity of it. 
The establishment of the magisteriwn served to preserve order in the 
church as a whole; it determined what was orthodox as far as public 
teaching goes, but private opinion cannot be regulated, and the magis-
terium itself was made up of people whose opinions differed. Two 
ecclesiastical teachers could appeal to the sarne Scripture to support 
contrary doctrines, as indeed Jesus and the Pharisees came up with 
different interpretations for the Old Testament. The Ecumenical Creeds 
may have been hailed as a rule of faith, but they set out to confess 
the chief articles of belief, not to provide a henneneutical principle 
for the canon. For instance, one might agree with all of the articles 
of the creed and yet have a position on soteriology which is contrary 
to John's or Luke's or Paul's. 
For Moltma.nn the hermeneutical center of the Scripture is 
eschatology, the expectation of the future and the effect of that 
expect·ation on the present. Whether Moltmann is talking about Abraham, 
the Exodus, the Prophets, or the Corinthians, he is chiefly interested 
in what they expected and how that anticipation changed their lives. 
Thus the message of the church today consists of a call to anticipate 
the kingdom of God and, correspondingly, to embark upon the journey 
of conquest. 
This does not mean that Moltmann overlooks the cross of Jesus. 
On the contrary, Holtmann insists upon what he calls the eschato-
logia crucis. If anticipation of the kingdom is the chief objective 
of the kerygma, the memory of the cross is the medium of the message. 
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Thus, applied to hermeneutics, if the anticipation of the kingdom is 
the center of the promise, the memory of the cross and resurrection 
constitutes the center of the proclamation of its fulfilment. Not only 
is the cross inseparable from the resurrection; neither can dominate 
nor obscure the other. They constitute one event. The counterpart of 
that event is the hopeful striving, the expectant conflict of the 
"exodus church," which is the contempora ry disci ples of the crucified, 
risen, and coming Jesus. 
For the orthodox Christian church, "eschatology" has always had 
a transcendent meaning. ~ome of this may be due to what r,Joltmann 
calls iiellenization, but this contention cannot be proved because when 
one reads the Apocalyptic writings one finds the same transcendental 
note. In systematic theology, "eschatology" refers to the teachings 
/ 
concerning death, life after death, the 11rJf<N ~<.J. , and the last 
judgment. Various sects have insisted on including the millenium as a 
legitimate biblical eschatological doctrine, but the orthodox church 
as a whole has taken a negative position on chiliasm (for example, 
Confession, XVII). 
The term "kingdom of God" was at one time identified with the 
orthodox church as the leadership of a Christian society, or else with 
"Christendom," society itself. But it was not long before church and 
society came into conflict with one another, and the church came to 
view Christendom as a mixed blessing, while it thought of itself as 
the spiritual empire co-existing with the human city and in dialogue 
with it. There followed a period of intense conflict between the 
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church and the Christian society, marked by various attempts to define 
civil and ecclesiastical preprogatives until the age of Innocent III, 
when the church emerged as the de facto £eudal suzerain over the state. 
That was a delicate balance which was 1ost as soon as the church tried 
to claim legal suzerainty as well. The structure of the spiritual 
empire crumbled, its institutions were discredited, the identification 
of the church Hith the kingdom of God was over. A reaction set in 
depicting the church as nothing more than a secular organization, 
while the "kingdom of God" passed from the realm of the rea li:Gable in 
history to the theoretical structures of the theologians. It became 
an ideal to be realized. And the ma. j ori ty opinion of the theologians 
who had not been completely secularized was that the realization of the 
kingdom required some kind of return to the conditions of the 
thirteenth century. 
For Luther the kingdom was not an ideal, but an evangelical 
reality.3 Luther could speak of "three kingdoms, 11 the first being the 
structure of God's Providential rule over the creation, the second 
being the church, not the institutional church but the hidden (abscondita) 
church, and the third being the transcendent eschatological estate of 
the blessed. In an important way these were really only one kingdom, 
for all were under the same King and His ultimate purposes were the 
same even though the structures through which He realized these pur-
poses differed. 
3werne r b.le rt, 1'he Stru t , 
H n (St. Louis: Conco d" \ure_of Luthera~ translated by ,Jalter 
anse r ia ubhshing Haus~, 1962), pp. 258-261. 
-
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The Reformed position held that the "kingdom of grace," through 
which the pilgrim progressed, was a visible, institutional entity 
which the church was obliged to realize in history. As a result of 
this difference, one might too quickly conclude that Moltrnann's escha-
tology, with its completely visible church, would be more at home with 
the Reformed than with Luther. Ultimately this may be the case, but 
historically, the Reformed tendency ha s been to identify God's provi-
dential blessing with His eschatological approval, a doctrine which 
i'1oltmann with his eschatologia crucis would repudiate . 
In his own historico-eschatological jargon Moltmann affirms the 
grace of God toward man, and he places the locus of this grace in the 
sense of promise, at the hermeneutical center. The questions he then 
brings to the Scriptures are not the traditional ones. Holtmann asks 
where the God of promise has revealed His faithfulness, and he finds 
this primarily in the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, though 
the prior revelations to Israel are important to point out God's con-
sistency as well as rlis radical freedom to adopt new ways . Along with 
the promise Holtmann finds the demand for parapatetic discipleship, 
but also anticipant discipleship. This demand gathers together an 
eschatological conununity which hopes for the kingdom of God under the 
conditions of the world, and moves toward the horizon beyond which it 
knows the future will dawn, bringing with it the new conditions of the 
kingdom of God. 
How can the orthodox church evalua Le i•lol tmann 1 s 'lheology of Hope? 
There are two items which are incompatible with orthodox doctrine . The 
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first is the closed unive rse; the other, Moltmann's unfortunate mixture 
of Law and Gospel, which prevents his church from existing in and co-
operating with ar.~, given historical society. As to the former, Molt-
mann may be able to produce a substantial polemic against positivistic 
historicism, but he is able to apply it only to the future. The past 
is still sealed up within a closed, Kantian system. Tha t system rejects 
!!. priori those miracles in which God revealed His grace. The second 
incompatibility consists in the way tfoltmann describes promis e, that is, 
as primarily agenda. To achieve blessedness, who receives the promise 
will accept and fulfill that agenda. I n orthodox theology one must first 
be blessed in order to undertake the agenda. 'l'hese faults a re the more 
unfortunate because 1'loltmann knows the Scripture as well, and because 
he sympathizes with the Christian Church. Uut we must clas sify him as 
a heterodox writer and theologian the writer of a theology which the 
church cannot accept as orthodox. 
1-bltmann and Modern Historical Epistemology 
The previous section compared Moltmann's eschatology and 
henneneutics with their classical orthodox counterparts. The follow-
ing section is concerned with the study of history in our. time and 
with how Moltmann 1 s theology of hope "takes history seriously. 11 As 
this subject is presented the reader is asked to remember once again 
i•loltrnann's claim that, ,vhile for Schweitzer, while history swallows up 
eschatology, for ::ichweitzer and for i.lultmann, eschatology swallows up 
history, the new historico-eschatological school does j ustice to both. 
'' 
Since so much of r4oltmann 's historical study has IJeen devoted to 
the Bible, and since, as was noted in (;hapter II above, there was an 
impasse between historical reason and the knowledge of faith, the matter 
of historical epistemology seems to be the critical point. The author 
has made use of h. G. (;ollingwood's work, The Idea of History, as repre-
sentative of the best of modern, post-Positivistic, yet non-theological 
treatments of historica l epistemology. Certain theologians, na~ely 
Knox, Thielecke, and Pannenberg, whom r-ioltmann either quotes or refers 
to, have also been brought together beside Theology of Hope for pur-
poses of comparison. 
what is an event? 
Every historician speaks of events. Events are the matter of 
history. And events are important for 1•:0ltmann, too; for his escha-
tology is grounded in events. Does that mean hope is grounded in fact, 
or perhaps in facts? Moltmann is able to speak rather comfortably 
about the fact of the crucifixion, but prefers the term "event" which 
includes occurrence and interpretation when speaking of the resurrec-
tion, although sometimes it is evident from the context (for example, 
"mere event") that this distinction is far from consistent. It is not 
clear, then, whether when Moltmann speaks of the resurrection as an 
event he means it as something less than fact or something more than 
fact. 
John Knox distinguishes a "fact" from an "event." The latter 
is the basic category for an analysis of history and the way 
in which it is known. One cannot speak of an historical subject. 
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From this it follows that one cannot point to Jesus without 
indicating the Christian conununity, which is the response 
that constitutes a part of the "Christ-event." Under this 
procedure, the New Testament does not stand outside of the 
church as an objective kerygma, but appears in its true 
identity as a concretion of the earliest portion of the 
community's memory, representing the living continuity of 
the present church with its origins. Jesus Christ, church, 
and New Testament are viewed as an internally related triad 
after the analogy of the kno4m, the knower, and the knower's interpretation of the known. 
Now Knox is using "subject" and "object" language here which 
Moltmann will not accept, nevertheless, if the New Testament is an 
"interpretation of the known," and Jesus is "the known," then the 
"event," the "triad," is not the same thing as the fact. The event 
is greater than the fact because the fact alone is not part of hwnan 
consciousness as the event is. 
Compare this with Collingwood's analysis of the "inside of the 
event." 
When a scientist asks why a piece of litmus paper turns pink 
he means to ask the occasions on which pieces of litmus ' paper?·· 
turned pink. When the historian asks why Brutus stabbed 
Caesar, he means to ask what Brutus thought that made him 
decide to stab Caesar. The cause of the event, for him, 
means the thought in the mind of the person by whose agency 
the event came aQout: and this is not something other than 
the event, it is the inside of the event itself.5 
By this standard, is the church the "agent" by which the kerygma 
came about? Is the "thought" of the historical Jesus that "made him 
decide" to go to the cross the real "inside of the event" upon which 
eschatology depends? Moltmann does not see the question as being this 
4Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 62-63• 
5R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Hit 
194 ~), PP• 214-21 5 • 'I'his work is based s o~r; 
ten in 1936. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
series of lectures writ-
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clear-cut. The church and Jesus are both agents of history, but also 
products of it. Their thoughts are not so much the "inside" of events 
as they are the creatures of the historical situation, particularly the 
"horizon of expectation." 
Suspension and tension 
Moltmann is essentially in agreement with Collingwood, only 
instead of "thought" produced by an "agent," Moltmann finds as the 
true inside of the event eschatology, the promise-oriented aspect of 
the event, which is a product of "the future" as seen from the his-
torical subject's horizon of expectation. Collingwood says, 
By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it 
which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements • 
• • • By the inside of the event I mean that in it which can 
only be described in terms of thought •••• -The historian is 
never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the 
other. He is investigating not mere events (where by a mere 
event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but 
actions, and6an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event. 
Collingwood see~ the future as a product of the present. Molt-
mann sees the reverse. But substitute the term "horizon of expecta-
tion" for the tenn "thought" in the passage just quoted from Collingwood. 
See that the meaning is hardly changed. For both Xoltmann and Colling-
wood the content of history is tension, tension between the historical 
subject and his expectations. Because· Collingwood sees the future as 
a product of the present, he would say that historical events are at-
tempts to change or create expectations. I4oltmann would disagree. 
He says, 
'Ibid., p. 213. 
• 
1@2 
If events are experienced within the horizon of remembered and 
expected promises, then are experienced as truly historic events~ 
They do not then have only the accidental, individual, and re-
lative character which we normally ascribe to historic events, 
but also have an unfinished and provisional character that points 
ahead. Events experienced within the horizon of promise and hope 
bear the mark of something still outstanding.? 
They are "still outstanding" because the hope did not originate with 
the historical subject. ivhat the subject di d have was a glimpse of the 
future. Rather than creating expectations, events, viewed this way, 
represent attempts to realize expectations. 
The facts of history must be understood not as process com-
plete in themselves but as stages on a road that goes further 
and elements in a process that continues. Events experienced 
this way must be passed on because in them something is seen 
which is determinative for future generations. On the other 
hand, they may be freely interpreted and actualized by each 
new present, since they are never so firmly established that 
we could rgstrict ourselves merely to ascertaining what they 
once were. 
Thus history, for Moltmann, is the science of this tension that 
lies between the future which has been partially revealed and the 
subject's historical situation. Moltmann uses the word "suspension,"' 
a term indicative of instability but also of freedom. Suspension is 
always between two poles. The future is one pole, the other is the 
remembered promise, a word from God that calls forth the future. 
Reason and faith 
The last question to be considered here under Holtmann and 
historical epistemology has to do with the role of faith (or perhaps 
7 Ju·rgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, translated by James ;v . Leitch 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 107-108. 
8Ibid. 
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the role of hope) over against reason in the interpretation of his-
torical events. Moltmann, as was demonstrated in Chapter II above, 
took care not to subject the secular reality, the Wirklichkeit with 
which every historian works, to the faith-judgments of a small group of 
people, lest theology become an obscurantist discipline. To avoid this, 
that is, to escape what has been called the second side of the impasse, 
floltmann insists upon some kind of historical-critical hermeneutics 
rather than existential, "kerygmatic" theology. 
Moltmann here agrees with the position of Helmuth Thielicke, 
who, in reaction to the neo-orthodox contention that the Gospel needs 
no historical verification, claimed that more objectivity was needed 
if the kerygma was to do its job. 10 According to Thielicke, there are at 
least three good reasons for historical-critical examination: (1) His-
torical reason may not be supressed, but must be redeemed as part of the 
total man; (2) The boundary between faith's uniqueness and other know-
ledge must be determined; and (3) Historical criticism must determine 
whether or not its results contradict the content of the Easter kerygma, 
with the stipulation that truth is indivisible, and therefore faith 
cannot be grounded in a non-event.11 Holtmann would add, however, that 
hope is really 11grounded" in the event of the future, but that know-
ledge of the future depends upon the promises, which in turn revolve 
around Jesus and his resurrection. The resurrection, whatever it may 
mean historically for l-bltmann, is certainly not · a non-event. It is an 
10ttel.llut Thielicke, 11 'l'he Resurrection Kerygma," The Easter Messa e 
for Today, translated by ;jalvator Attanasio and Darrell Guder New York: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1~64), P• ?,. 
11 Ibid., pp. 79-84. 
104 
"eschatologically new" event. And the "exodus church" created by the 
resurrection brings the redemption for human re;.i. son. As for the unique-
ness of the .faith, i"ioltmann would say that other knowledge depends upon 
empirical investigation whereas Christian Faith knows the reality of 
its hope. Hope cannot be ernpirically investigated in advance. Dut, 
because the God of the promise has revea~ed His faithfulness, therefore 
He can and does lay His claim upon the reason. 
Reason alone does not attribute historical events to the agency of 
God. Indeed, Collingwood denies that God is, properly speaking, an 
historical subject, or even an historical object. To Collingwood, the 
Old Testament is not history at all; true history begins with Herodotus. 
P~nnenberg has taken exception to Collingwood's claim saying that the 
latter is only interested in methodology, in Historie and not Geschichte, 
and that Herodotus, whom Collingwood (after the Western academic tra-
dition) calls "the father of history, 11 was really only the father of 
Historie, that is, of a methodology for ascertaining facts. 12 The facts, 
however, are not Geschichte. For that, a new understanding of history 
is necessary. 13 
Is God, then genuine subject matter for history? God can be known 
by revelation t}}rough faith. But the "revelation II and 11 faith" that 
Pannenberg, and after him t·loltmann, talk about are not special, particu-
lar, or even theological. They are available in universal history, al-
though one must begin with particular events to gain knowledge of them. 
12"Redemptive Event and History" in Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics, 
edited by Klau~ Westermarm (ltichmond: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 320. 
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Here is an even greater difficulty: can a God who does not exist, 
or at least does not yet exist, be known? If He is known, then will He 
be in fact what He already is in theory? In Chapter IV the question 
was begged as to whether God's being and rule were separable. Pannen-
berg's contention is that they are not. God's being depends upon His 
rule. 14 Since God 1s rule has not yet come, then, if Pannenberg is right, 
God's being is still in the process of becoming. But reason must then 
have an object for its knowledge. And if God still does not exist 
then He cannot be the object of reason's knowledge. Therefore no man 
can say that he "knows God." 
Moltmann, as was pointed out in Chapter IV, differed from 
Pannenberg because of the latter's interest in events, which caused him 
to lose track of the promises, leading him to "retain the Greek cosmic 
theology in principle, though making it eschatological from the stand-
point of present epistemology. 111 5 Moltmann does net retain the Greek 
cosmic theology because he does not tie revelation to events. Events 
belong to the province of reason, like facts, while the promise that 
interprets them, the "inside of the event," belongs to the province of 
hope. God's rule is not an event. But His being, and therefore His 
rule, can be known to the one who hopes for it. 
For Moltmann there is an even more compelling reason for separating 
God's being from His rule. This is the eschatologia crucis, the contra-
diction of the cross from which God rules and yet does not rule. The 
14 , See Chap. IV, fn. 50. 
15 Moltmann, p. 78. 
10, 
one who hopes knows the contradiction of the cross (in this sense the 
cross is an event), and in it he knows God. On the cross, God's being 
is in contradiction to His rule, and there the matter would well rest 
but for the resurrection which announces the union of God's being and 
His rule for the future. 
Is Eschatology an Adequate Hermeneutical Center? 
This final section of the "Critique of Theology of Hope" builds 
upon what was discussed earlier in this chapter. The same definition 
of "a hermeneutical center" applies. Here it is the author's concern 
to deal with a printed criticism of Moltmann, to question the consis-
tency of using Bloch's atheistic eschatology as a philosophical point 
of contact for Christian theology, and to make a personal evaluation 
of Moltmann's position. 
Dyma1e 1s questionable criticism 
Every book that presents a new way of interpreting the Bible, 
Theology of Hope, is bound to have its critics. One early criticism 
that appeared in the popular press was Herbert Dymale's written from 
an evangelical viewpoint in Christianity Today. 16 He accuses Moltmann 
of by-passing the question of the historicity of the resurrection, of 
interpreting the event without establishing it in fact and thereby 
simply accepting the principle of analogy which was described above as 
the first side of the "impasse." It has been the position of this paper 
that Moltmann does not treat history the way Ernst Troeltsch did; this 
1 
•Herbert Dymale, 11What Kind of Hope is Adequate, 11 Christianity 
Today, XV (June 18, 1~71 ), 9-lQ (877-878)0 
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has been demonstrated with material from 'l'heolog,y of Hope. Dymale does 
not give Moltmann enough credit when he says the following: 
Little is gained by side-stepping the issue of historicity. 
As important as hope is, we dare not attach it to less than 
the historic data of an empty tomb and eyewitnesses. Molt-
mann's refusal to take seriously the question of historicity 
suggests an attempt to build a socio-ethical structure by 
capitalizing on the ready-formed sympathies implicit in the 
name CHRISTIAN sic .1·r 
Is this a fair criticism? Holtmann takes history far more 
.. 
seriously than Dyrnale would appear to admit. Moltmann's Uberlieferungsges-
chichte is a method of approaching data which even the Positivists 
would admit as "historical." However, Dymale issues an important 
caveat when he points out that 
Student activist groups at Tubingen have openly attacked 
professors and denounced the New Testament, particularly 
the death of Christ. Everything in the Bible that is not 
in line with improving society or outright favolution is, 
they have said, meaningless and irrelevant. 
Moltmann himself says that our own understanding of history is 
historically conditioned, therefore Dymale's insinuation that the acti-
vists influenced Theolog,y of Hope fits in even with Moltmann's own 
analysis. This may explain why in Moltmann I s later works the theology 
of hope is allowed to dri~ in favor of a political gospel. But in 
'I'heology of Hope Moltma.nn definitely does not denounce the death of 
Christ. Without denying the truth contained in Dymale's reference to 
the situation at ~bingen, his primary criticism fails to take into 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid. 
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account Moltmann's methodological solution to the impasse of historical 
.. 
understanding of the New Testament, namely, Uberlieferungsgeschichte. 
The gospel according to Bloch--Moltma.nn's weakness 
It appears to this writer that Moltmann's greatest weakness is not 
with his historical methodology, but rather with his metaphysical 
system that underlies his eschatological understanding of history. 
This system is very difficult to pinpoint in Theo~ogy of Hope because 
Moltmann does not describe it. He works with it. One cannot cite 
metaphysical treaties in Holtmann, one cites practical conclusions 
that follow from Moltmann' s use of Bloch I s principle of hope. For 
example 
This is why all proclamation stands in eschatological tension • 
• • • It is valid only to the extent that it is made valid. 
It is true to the extent that it announces the future of the 
truth. It communicates this .truth in such a way that we can 
have it onlv by confidently waiting for it and wholeheartedly 
seeking it. 1' 
For both ~bltrnann and Bloch, hope binds the individual to a 
specific program that he can find in his historical situation at the 
point where his vision of the kingdom intersects the horizon of expec-
tation. This program is usually connected with an eschatological 
community. This limitation is not due to biblical exegesis, but to the 
metaphysical system of Bloch, for whom there is no real gift in the 
theological sense. 
1, 
Moltmann, p. 326. 
The writings of Bloch make it clear that for him, a true child of 
the Renaissance who has adopted the literary style as well as the 
vleltanschauung of the optimistic, humanistic, universal man, Prometheus 
is normative, Christ is merely a symbol of the same aspiration, and the 
first Gospel is announced in Genesis 3, not by Yahweh-Elohim, but by 
the snake. 
But there is in us not only the dim Adam whose thirst to know 
good and evil was indeed quenched by Jesus the Savior and 
Aesculapius, the white, whitened, returned serpent of paradise. 
Standing above Adam is the dim Lucifer, and for his longing 
to be like God sic, for his truly divine parentage and 
heritage, not even Jesus himself has brought a recurrence, a 
clarifying justification, and the triumph of his essence that 
would clarify God himself.20 
Bloch credits early Christian Gnosticism for the identification of 
salvation with what the church properly calls "the Fall." The Ophites 
and Naasenes, whose cultic names are derived from vocables meaning 
"serpent," seized upon the concept of knowledge expressed in the temp-
tation of Eve.21 Bloch presents two curious reasons for containing the 
Christian Gospel in the assertion 11eritis sicut deus": 
1. The close connection between that Gospel and his own 
philosophy, 11S is not yet P." 
2. The claim that this Gospel "needs no demythologization. 1122 
This is not true atheism, as Bloch claims it is. It is Humanism, 
but Humanism of a more eschatological variety than either classical or 
20Ernst Bloch, "Christ, or the Uncovered Countenance, 11 translated by 
E. B. Ashton, Man on His Own (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) p. 109. 
21 see also Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Heligion (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1~58), pp. ,2-,4. 
22Ernst Bloch, "Religious Truth," translated by John Cumming, Man 
on His Own, p. 115. 
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Renaissance Humanism; indeed, it is anthropotheisrn. But by the term 
"anthropotheism" this writer does not wish to impose upon Bloch's meta-
physics a false interpretation based on a static idea of what man is. 
He only wishes to question the need to go to such lengths in philosophy 
in order to make a theological truth seem more real to the modern 
reader. Indeed, this is only the beginning, Bloch goes on to posit 
metempsychosis as a device through which the individual who works with 
creative hope in the present can lay claim to some future blessedness. 
~'ven Plato only spoke of metempsychosis in the last book of the 
Republic, a section which he himself called a "myth," but such a 
doctrine "needs no demythologization," according to Bloch. 
Bloch's confession of atheism only confuses the matter. Atheism 
predicates non-existence to God. But if 115 is not yet P, 11 how can the 
basic tenet of atheism be understood? Does Bloch mean that God does 
not yet exist, or that God does not yet not exist? Whichever way we 
take Bloch's assertions, for Moltmann, a confessed theist, God is an 
essential factor for the future. And if He is the God of Jesus, then 
He is holy, and His holiness contradicts any Humanism that may develop. 
Moltmann has partly overcome this weakness by separating God's being 
from His rule, and applying the formula 115 is not yet P" only to the 
latter. God is coming, for 1.Joltmann, God's kingdom is coming. But 
its "goal can be attained only by obediently follo,d.ng the promise. n23 
23 Moltmann, p. 325. 
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A personal evaluation 
This writer is convinced tha t Holtmann has found a methodology of 
historically-conscious biblical interpretation that avoids the impasse · 
of unders t anding described in Chapter II. He has found a principle of 
analogy that is not heteronomous to eschatology and yet is able to deal 
with the facts of history, the methodology of focusing attention on the 
traditions and on the situations that bounded the horizon of expectation 
of those who tried to realize past promises. But Moltmann has limited 
his theology by presenting it strictly in terms of Bloch's humanistic 
philosophy, a philosophy which, given the present horizon of expectation, 
directs hope , commitment, and promise to man as he is now, and charges 
him with the responsibility for realizing the pictures of perfection 
which come to him in the biblical promises. Specifically, for the 
present generation, the Christian coaununity can identify its mission 
with that of the revolutionaries. One suspects that the dialectical-
materialist "kingdom" serves the same function in that coming state 
which the doctrine of eternal life served in the capitalist state. 
Moltmann's "exodus church" is a means to an end. It corresponds 
to Bloch's "church of the future" which seems to generate propaganda 
for the socialist millenium while silencing criticism of the classless, 
warless, hopeless society. Both churches, as their authors have pre-
sented them, direct people to "creative problem solving." 
Such a church would be no church at all in the evangelical sense 
of that word. 'lhe promise ceases to be a gift, and becomes an adver-
tisement. The hearer is not a beneficiary, but a consumer who is in-
vited to do business with the future before it gains monopoly over 
-
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all men. He becomes totally committed to the kingdom not because it 
is free, but because it is so dear that it requires a lifetime to 
ammortize the debt upon it. This is a pointed and effective way of 
preaching God's Law; it lays the burden of producing the eschaton upon 
the conscience, then provides no po\~er. 
Creative problem solving, theologically considered, is a demand 
1 , 
for love, for tA 1'"1f+, , something which flesh and blood cannot give. 
There is a place for the cross in 1·1oltrnann 's theology, but only as a 
theological interpretation of the contradiction between the eschatological 
community and the society. One may speak of faith, but only as it works 
itself out in service to the world. This is a secularized form of fides 
caritate formata, the Tridentine heresy. 
Most of the system of Theology of Hope can be redeemed from its 
weaknesses and become a useful expression of evangelical theology. To 
be so redeemed, it needs a concept of grace that does justice to the 
biblical doctrine of God's concern for the individual's eschatological 
e.xistence, and that manife8ted itself in the atoning death of Jesus and 
the miracle of his resurrection. This miracle, and indeed all miracles, 
must not be demythologized. This is a difficult thing to say, but 
miracles are not offensive because of human knowledge; they are offensive 
because they call nomological existence as such into question, and man 
/ 
depends upon \IOµ.OS in all of its forms to justify his existence. A 
miracle expresses a holy will outside of man's control, and when men 
see it, as in the case of the Galileans, "fear seizes them all." ,•ian 
11 J 
/ 
cannot manipulate the universe by. learning its VOJ.O~ any more than 
/ he can attain righteousness from the moral vo,,_o., 
; 
On the contrary, 
"There is forgiveness with Thee, that 'l'hou mayest be feared" (Psalm 
1JQ), Once a man surrenders to the Forgiver, then he can say with 
confidence, 11 I wait for the Lord • • • and in His ;1ord I hope. 11 
There is much more that could be said about Theology of Hope. 
However, this critique is concerned only with assigning a label to 
Moltmann's system which will identify its place in current theology, 
and to give reasons for the label chosen. 1he writer regrets that so 
many words were required for purposes of clarification with a view to 
dealing ·,,i th as much af Moltmann I s material as possible. 
The point of departure for this critique was the relationship 
between Moltmann and the historical orthodo:xy. So a swnmary conclusion 
regarding that relationship, heretofore denied the reader, is to be 
expected. ~10ltma.nn does not stand in the orthodox Christian tradition. 
But he writes in such a way that he seems to be sympathetic with it. 
In reality he rejects it. for all of Holtrnann's polemics against posi-
tivism, he cannot escape that label himself, for he is committed to 
Kantian epistemology. He is different from Schweitzer in that he intro-
duces the expectation of vindication rather than eternal tragedy. But in 
the essential locus, he is exactly like Schweitzer, for his universe is 
closed to grace. Moltmann's God is a God who will act, not a God who 
acts. Grace is a future noumenon, not a present phenomenon. It is a 
crippled grace, a demythologized grace, a helping of those who help 
themselves, even if it is not a crass, materialistic self-helping. 
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This writer has used the word "anthropotheistic" to describe Molt-
rnann' s theology. We ought to understand by this term that Moltmann 's 
God is impersonal; either He is the historical process itself, or He is 
noumenal, but so remote that He can be apprehended only within the his-
torical process. This is not Christian because, as was stated above, 
the burden for producing the eschaton is laid upon the human conscience, 
and no real grace is connnunicated through the promise. 
But Moltma.nn's work need not be in vain. The Law of God needs to 
be proclaimed in every age, and much of Moltmann's material proclaims 
it well, when grace and the hope of heaven are then used properly to 
console, regenerate, and equip the hearer, then a genuine Church can 
be cultivated which will be on its way to the Kingdom of glory. 
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